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When insisting that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First Amendment, 
Jeffersonian Republicans cast their argument in historical terms, claiming that 
the Speech and Press Clauses eliminated any federal power to restrict 
expression. Scholars, in turn, have generally accepted that Republicans had a 
consistent understanding of the First Amendment throughout the 1790s. But 
Founding Era constitutionalism was dynamic in practice, even while often 
conservative in rhetoric, and scholars have missed the striking novelty of the 
principal argument against the Sedition Act. Republicans had taken a rights 
provision and transformed it into a federalism rule. 
Mostly ignored in the literature, and never analyzed as a central feature of 
the opposition to the Sedition Act, the problem of partisan jury selection drove 
the shift in Republican thought. As originally understood, speech and press 
freedoms put juries primarily in charge of administering governmental 
limitations of expression. Following the development of political parties, 
however, Republicans perceived that the guarantee of a jury trial was nearly 
meaningless when federal jurors were hand selected by partisan federal 
marshals. In response, Republicans promoted a new reading of the First 
Amendment. Deeply suspicious of abuse by federal judges and juries, 
Republicans insisted that the First Amendment deprived the federal government 
of any authority to regulate speech or the press, even though analogous speech 
and press clauses at the state level left considerable room for states to regulate 
harmful expression. 
This episode reveals a latent tension in eighteenth-century 
constitutionalism. Some threads of Founding Era thought embraced the notion 
of a document with fixed meaning, but other features encouraged constitutional 
evolution as conditions changed. Rather than seeking a principled resolution of 
this tension, however, Republicans developed entirely new arguments and then 
cast them in historical terms. The invention of First Amendment federalism also 
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raises the possibility of a different path for modern speech doctrine, guided less 
by a particular theory of why speech is special and more by practical concerns 
about political entrenchment and politically biased enforcement. 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 518 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ..................................................................... 525 
A. Eighteenth-Century Rights ...................................................... 526 
B. Speech and Press Freedoms ..................................................... 529 
C. The First Amendment .............................................................. 534 
II. THE CABELL AFFAIR ........................................................................... 540 
A. The Presentment ...................................................................... 541 
B. The Jeffersonian Response ...................................................... 548 
III. THE SEDITION ACT .............................................................................. 551 
A. Congressional Debates ............................................................ 552 
B. Republican Opposition ............................................................ 557 
IV. THE INVENTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT FEDERALISM ....................... 561 
A. Recasting History .................................................................... 561 
B. Juries, Judges, and Expressive Freedom ................................. 567 
 
Introduction 
In May 1797, with partisan tempers flaring, a Federalist-dominated 
federal grand jury in Richmond presented “as a real evil the circular Letters 
of several members of the late Congress, and particularly Letters with the 
Signature of [Virginia Republican] Samuel J. Cabell.”1 Coming a year before 
the infamous Sedition Act of 1798, the presentment unleashed a torrent of 
criticism and catalyzed Republican thought on speech and press freedoms. 
Crucially, it taught Republicans that they could no longer rely on juries as the 
great “palladium of liberty.”2 As the Virginia House of Delegates explained 
that winter, juries had become a tool for the “subjection of the natural right 
of speaking and writing freely, to the censure and controul of Executive 
power.”3 Republicans, in response, developed a new conception of the 
 
1. Presentment of the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia (May 22, 1797) 
[hereinafter Presentment of the Grand Jury], in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 181, 181 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1990). 
2. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *350 (“[T]he liberties of England 
cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate . . . .”); A NATIVE OF 
VIRGINIA, OBSERVATIONS UPON THE PROPOSED PLAN OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1788) 
(asserting that in prosecutions of “a bold writer, or any other person, who had become obnoxious to 
[the government,] . . . the trial by jury may well be called the palladium of liberty”), reprinted in 9 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 655, 686 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
3. Resolution of the Virginia House of Delegates, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER 
(Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at 2. 
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Speech and Press Clauses, arguing that the First Amendment removed all 
federal authority over expression, even though state speech and press 
guarantees left ample room for state-level regulations of harmful speech. 
The basic problem, as Republican congressional leader Albert Gallatin 
explained during the Sedition Act debates, was jury selection. The Judiciary 
Act, it turns out, put federal marshals in charge of hand selecting federal 
jurors in many mid-Atlantic and Southern states. Back in 1789, executive 
control over juror selection enhanced rights, helping to ensure that creditors 
received fairer treatment in federal courts than in state courts dominated by 
parochial juries. But following the emergence of political parties in the 
1790s, the selection of jurors by a federal marshal—a “creature of the 
Executive,” as Gallatin put it—raised grave problems in politically charged 
cases.4 “[W]hen the supposed crimes to be punished were a libel against the 
Administration,” Gallatin asked rhetorically, “what security of a fair trial 
remained to a citizen, when the jury was liable to be packed by the 
Administration, when the same men were to be judges and parties?”5 
Mostly ignored by scholars, and never analyzed as a central feature of 
Republican thought,6 the problem of partisan jury selection lay at the heart of 
opposition to the Sedition Act and powerfully shaped Republican strategy 
and rhetoric about speech and press freedoms. Republicans widely 
acknowledged that libelous speech ought to be proscribed, and many agreed 
that seditious speech should be criminally punished. But critics of the 
government, Congressman Edward Livingston explained, would much 
 
4. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2164 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). 
5. Id. 
6. Many scholars have pointed out Republican complaints about jury selection, usually once 
sedition prosecutions were underway, but these scholars have not explored how fears of partisan 
juries shaped Republican thought about speech and press freedoms in the first place. E.g., 3 ALBERT 
J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 42–43 (1919); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH 78 (1920); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 67–68 (2000); 
PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE FREE PRESS CRISIS OF 1800: THOMAS COOPER’S TRIAL FOR 
SEDITIOUS LIBEL 47–48 (2011); Frank Maloy Anderson, The Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition 
Laws, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1912, at 
115, 125–26 (1914); Juror Reform Bills of 1800, in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 270, 270 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); 
Kathryn Preyer, United States v. Callender: Judge and Jury in a Republican Society, in ORIGINS OF 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 173, 182–83 (Maeva Marcus 
ed., 1992); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Story of the Sedition Act of 1798: “The Reign of Witches”, in 
FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 13, 20 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012). 
Richard Buel Jr. observes that lessened confidence in juries reinforced longstanding Republican 
opposition to proscribing political opinions, RICHARD BUEL JR., SECURING THE REVOLUTION: 
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1789-1815, at 251–52 (1972), and Adrienne Koch and Harry 
Ammon note that Jefferson’s effort to reform jury selection was an aspect “of one campaign to 
defend civil liberties,” Adrienne Koch & Harry Ammon, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: 
An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 145, 153 
(1948), but these works do not account for the Republicans’ innovative theory of the First 
Amendment. 
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likelier “receive an impartial trial” in a state tribunal, without “a jury selected 
by an officer holding his office at the will of the President.”7 With Federalists 
running all three branches of the national government, Republicans skeptical 
about the administration of speech-suppressing laws channeled their thinking 
toward an innovative reading of the First Amendment. 
The Republican account of the First Amendment departed substantially 
from prevailing ideas about speech and press freedoms.8 In the late eighteenth 
century, American elites generally understood the freedom of speech as a 
natural right, qualified in its scope and without concrete legal effect. This 
principle essentially meant that the government could regulate expression 
only pursuant to law and only in promotion of the public good, as determined 
in good faith by the people and their representatives. For many, the freedom 
of speech also imposed a more categorical limit on governmental power, 
barring punishment of well-intentioned statements of one’s thoughts but 
leaving the government free to punish efforts to deceive others. The freedom 
of the press was multifaceted, too, providing both a broad requirement that 
the government restrict publishing only in the public interest and a narrower 
categorical ban on licensing rules that imposed “prior restraints” on printers. 
The latter of these effectively ensured that juries stood between the 
government and any restrictions on the press. 
By the late 1790s, after national political parties had developed, these 
conventional speech and press freedoms offered little solace to Republicans. 
The guarantee of a jury trial was nearly meaningless if jurors were hand 
selected by federal marshals, whose search for jurors of sound judgment 
would naturally lead them to people with similar political views. And once 
the jury was stacked, substantive protections would be worthless, too. 
Partisan juries, they perceived, would tend to view invectives against the 
Adams Administration as breaching the Sedition Act’s prohibition of “false, 
 
7. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2153 (1798) (statement of Rep. Edward Livingston). 
8. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 312 (2017) 
(“This view became prominent only later in the 1790s, when Republicans realized that Federalist 
control of all three branches of the federal government, combined with the administration’s ability 
to choose jurors, threatened their political survival.”). For more on speech and press freedoms from 
the Founding Era to the Sedition Act, see generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, REPRESSIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE LEGACY 
OF ENGLISH LAW (2010); LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); David A. 
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); David. S. Bogen, The 
Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429 (1983); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural 
Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993); William T. Mayton, 
Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); 
and David M. Rabban, The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early 
American History, 37 STAN. L. REV. 795 (1985). For a closer look at non-elite attitudes, see Saul 
Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual 
History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 748–54 (2013) and Saul Cornell, 
The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the 
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 326–34 (2011). 
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scandalous and malicious” writings—a narrowly drawn legal rule that 
comported with prevailing law. Strongly suspicious of abuse by federal 
judges and juries, Republicans insisted that the First Amendment 
categorically deprived the federal government of any authority to regulate 
speech or the press. 
Scholars tend to treat Republican views about the federal Speech and 
Press Clauses as mostly static, making the fight over the Sedition Act an 
opportunity for the Founding generation to hash out a constitutional 
disagreement that had been lurking throughout the 1790s.9 On this view, the 
election of 1800 was pivotal in fixing the role of speech and press freedoms 
in American democracy. “In their first opportunity to weigh in on the matter,” 
Akhil Amar writes, “American voters sided with [James] Madison, vaulting 
his mentor and fellow free-speech champion Thomas Jefferson into the 
executive mansion and sweeping the Jefferson-Madison party into 
congressional power.”10 Importantly, this conventional account lends an air 
of originalist support for our more libertarian approach to modern First 
Amendment law. 
There are some grains of truth to this story of historical continuity. 
Republicans and Federalists frequently clashed in the 1790s over the role of 
popular participation in politics,11 and this conflict occasionally led to 
 
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 
815, 837 (“The abstract language of the First Amendment left unresolved differing views about the 
meaning of freedom of speech and press; these disputes would break out into the open later on in 
the 1790s . . . .”); James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The 
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 121 
(1999) (“[T]he Sedition Act was really a ‘last hurrah’ and pyrrhic victory in a conflict between a 
fading ‘republican’ and still emerging ‘liberal’ understanding of representation and the political and 
social order.”). For portrayals of Republican views as consistent over the 1790s, see, for example, 
Anderson, supra note 8, at 529–33; Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: 
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1567–
71 (1995); and Mayton, supra note 8, at 117–21. When scholars have drawn on the dynamism of 
the period, it is often to emphasize a putative shift in views among Federalists. E.g., Anderson, 
supra note 8, at 519–20. Leonard Levy, it is worth noting, famously argued that Republican views 
substantially evolved in the 1790s. But where Levy perceived continuity in an understanding of the 
First Amendment as a categorical bar on federal regulations of expression, LEVY, supra note 8, at 
323, and novelty in Madison’s more liberal understanding of speech and press freedoms, id. at 320–
25, my view is the opposite. Nobody at the Founding argued that the First Amendment would have 
a different effect than state speech and press freedoms, but other arguments against the Sedition Act 
were not—as David Rabban rightly points out—“a sudden breakthrough in libertarian thought.” 
Rabban, supra note 8, at 852. 
10. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 169 (2012). For those keeping score, Americans’ first electoral 
opportunity to weigh in on the Sedition Act was the election of 1798—a tidal wave Federalist 
victory. In another work, Amar wrote that “a popular majority adjudicated the First Amendment 
question in the election of 1800, by throwing out the haughty and aristocratic rascals who had tried 
to shield themselves from popular criticism.” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 23 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]. The Sedition Act, he 
emphasized, was a “betrayal of the original Bill of Rights.” Id. at 305. 
11. See COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN, JAMES MADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN SELF-
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disputes over speech and press freedoms.12 Not every rejoinder to the 
Sedition Act was novel. But the dominant Republican argument was a 
substantial departure from earlier views. When it came to interpreting the 
First Amendment, the only consensus position among Republicans in the late 
1790s was that federal protections, unlike state-level guarantees, 
categorically barred any regulation of expression.13 At the heart of their 
campaign against the Sedition Act, Republicans were recasting the First 
Amendment as a rule about the allocation of power between the federal and 
state governments, not as a guarantee of rights.14 
The Republican invention of First Amendment federalism highlights 
latent tensions in American constitutionalism at the Founding. On the one 
hand, dynamism and creativity thrived. Partisan political objectives were 
certainly one catalyst for constitutional change, but there were other 
contributors too. From an experiential standpoint, Americans were born and 
bred in the evolutionary culture of English customary constitutionalism, 
where time and again new constitutional principles had emerged from 
prominent public controversies. This experience made it second nature for 
the Founders to argue for new constitutional rules.15 And from a more 
philosophical bent, elites still embraced flexible interpretive principles 
derived from social-contract theory, like the idea that constitutions should be 
construed to promote the public good. 
At the same time, however, Americans were beginning to think about 
and describe their constitution in conservative—even static—terms. To be 
sure, this phenomenon was not entirely new. English constitutional rhetoric 
 
GOVERNMENT 54 (2009) (describing the conflict between James Madison and Alexander Hamilton 
as being “propelled by a fundamental philosophic disagreement over the nature and role of public 
opinion in a republic”). See generally JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION IN CRISIS (1993) (providing an overview of political conflict in the 
1790s). 
12. See BUEL, supra note 6, at 91–136 (highlighting disagreements over the role of public 
opinion in various conflicts throughout the 1790s). 
13. See Walter Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 
1970 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 129–35 (discussing the Republican opposition to the Sedition Act and 
simultaneous acceptance of analogous state laws). For a brief summary of Jefferson’s views, see 
Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 694–99 (1998). 
14. Although limiting powers was sometimes a means for protecting liberty, the Founding 
generation did not equate “retaining rights” and “reserving powers” in the way that much of the 
modern scholarship suggests. 
15. See, e.g., Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 
1104, 1171–74 (2013) (describing the emergence of the anticommandeering principle post-
ratification); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American 
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
932, 1017–18 (2010) (observing that Federalists and Republicans had “a tendency to reargue” 
constitutional issues of foreign policy that had appeared settled at the time of ratification); Richard 
Primus, “The Essential Characteristic”: Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States, 
117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018) (presenting Madison’s enumerated-powers argument against the 
national bank, and the ensuing debate, as novel). 
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had long been backward-looking, replete with claims about the fundamental 
law that had existed since “[t]ime immemorial.”16 But as historian Jonathan 
Gienapp has revealed, the idea of constitutional fixity took a new form in the 
early 1790s as Americans came to associate the writtenness of the 
constitutional text with a permanence in constitutional meaning.17 In other 
words, the Founders increasingly viewed their own constitutionalism as a 
new type of enterprise, rooted in the interpretation of a historical document 
with fixed meaning. 
With the Republican invention of First Amendment federalism, these 
strands of Founding Era constitutionalism powerfully collided. Republicans 
explicitly made arguments about the emergence of a new and unanticipated 
constitutional problem: the partisan selection of federal jurors. That point 
bears repeating. Republicans openly discussed the existence of new problems 
that, in their view, required a particular construction of the First Amendment. 
Yet when making these observations, they were constrained by the incipient 
notion of a fixed constitution, limiting their ability to articulate a case for 
interpretive change. The result was a sharp disjunction in their practice and 
rhetoric. Republicans adopted a novel constitutional position, based on a 
forceful argument about how long-held principles ought to apply to new 
circumstances, all the while casting their argument in originalist terms. 
Demonstrating the novelty of the Republican position against the 
Sedition Act begins in Part I with a survey of debates about expressive 
freedom a decade earlier. Discussions of speech and press freedoms at that 
point featured an assortment of ideas, but no one articulated a theory of the 
First Amendment’s Speech and Press Clauses premised on federalism. To be 
sure, some Founders had more robust theories of expressive freedom than 
others, and some had a limited view of congressional power to restrict 
expression under Article I. But nobody thought that the First Amendment had 
a categorical effect while state constitutional guarantees did not. The whole 
point of enumerating federal speech and press rights, in fact, was to ensure 
parity in the protection of those rights at the federal and state levels. At the 
same time, this Part illuminates the more flexible thinking about rights in the 
1780s that helped shape Republican thinking about the Sedition Act a decade 
later. 
Part II turns to the Cabell affair, explaining how Republicans came to 
realize that the advent of political parties, combined with the hand selection 
of jurors, opened the door to substantial partisan abuses. Partisanship, in other 
words, undermined the effectiveness of conventional speech and press 
 
16. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN LIBERTY 29–30 (2005). 
17. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN 
THE FOUNDING ERA (2018). 
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freedoms.18 And with these concerns in mind, Jefferson and his political allies 
began to shift toward a new view of the First Amendment—all of this 
occurring months before the Sedition Act was even conceived. 
The Sedition Act is addressed in Part III, with a focus on the Republican 
opposition. As is true with any innovative thinking, Republican ideas about 
the First Amendment reflected continuity with certain strands of their earlier 
views. When opposing state authority to levy taxes to support religious 
instruction in Virginia in the mid-1780s, for instance, Jefferson and Madison 
had described the inalienable natural right to conscience in a way that 
categorically disclaimed state power to legislate on religious matters. 
(Notably, their argument lacked any federalism dimension.) And a few years 
later, during the ratification debates, some Founders had denied the existence 
of any affirmative federal power to regulate printers under Article I. 
Moreover, when emphasizing that hand selecting jurors effectively allowed 
the administration to decide its own cases, Republicans tapped into a 
longstanding natural-law principle that “a man is not to be a judge in his own 
cause.”19 These constitutional traditions provided crucial ingredients for later 
developments in Republican thought. 
What was strikingly novel about the opposition to the Sedition Act, 
however, was their conclusion: The First Amendment imposed a categorical 
ban on federal power to regulate expression even though analogous state 
constitutional guarantees did not. Faced with dire concerns about the 
administration of a federal sedition law, Republicans sought to transform the 
Speech and Press Clauses into a rule about the allocation of federal and state 
power. Rather than argue that new circumstances required a change in 
constitutional interpretation, however, Republicans cast their argument in 
terms of original meaning. The First Amendment, Madison asserted in his 
famous Virginia Report of 1800, “was meant as a positive denial to Congress, 
of any power whatever on the subject.”20 
Part IV evaluates the Republican effort to revise history. It hardly needs 
mention that the Sedition Act deserves its place as a national embarrassment. 
But that is no reason to afford a mythical status to its opposition. Republican 
constitutional arguments against the Sedition Act—though still defended by 
 
18. For an assessment of the broader constitutional impact of the development of parties, see 
generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312 (2006). 
19. Anarchy, To the Anti-Federal Electors of the County of Dutchess, POUGHKEEPSIE 
COUNTRY J., Mar. 18, 1788, reprinted in 21 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1449, 1450 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2005); see also, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan University Press 1961) 
(“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra, at 538 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”).  
20. James Madison, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
303, 339 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991); see id. at 340 (declaring that the First Amendment 
“was intended as a positive and absolute reservation” of any “power whatever over the press”).  
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many scholars and often used in modern constitutional argument21—were 
deeply problematic. Contorted understandings of history and federalism, not 
a liberal conception of expressive freedom, endured as the oft-invoked 
“principles of ‘98.” 
But rather than abandoning the Republican opposition to the Sedition 
Act as a centerpiece of our constitutional tradition, perhaps we might elevate 
it in a different way. The enduring insight of Republicans was not their 
wholly invented idea that the Speech and Press Clauses were designed as a 
federalism rule. Nor was it a theoretical account of why speech deserves 
special constitutional protection—a perspective that dominates modern 
judicial decisions and academic commentary on expressive freedom.22 As 
argued elsewhere, “[H]istory undermines the notion that the First 
Amendment itself embraces a particular rationale for protecting 
expression.”23 The Republican invention of First Amendment federalism, 
which also lacked a theoretical account, bolsters that conclusion.24 Rather, 
the enduring insight of Republicans was that speech-restrictive rules are 
dangerous when designed and implemented to entrench political power. 
That idea could help reorient First Amendment doctrine today. As 
originally designed, the First Amendment recognized only a few determinate 
rules and otherwise left the government free to regulate speech and the press 
to promote the public good. The Republicans opposed to the Sedition Act 
tapped into this principle, worried that Federalists were not pursuing the 
interests of the whole political society but instead were simply trying to 
entrench their own power. As we will see, several foundational First 
Amendment decisions in the twentieth century stem from a similar concern 
about partiality in governmental decisions.25 Since then, however, doctrine 
has gravitated toward an overriding (and ahistorical) emphasis on content and 
viewpoint neutrality. Perhaps it is time to bring the pursuit of the public good 
back to the fore. 
I. The First Amendment 
To understand how Republicans reinterpreted the First Amendment in 
the late 1790s, we first need to consider where matters stood a decade earlier. 
 
21. E.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS IN AMERICA 47–48 (1991); Bybee, supra note 9, at 1556, 1567–71. For further 
discussion, see infra notes 259–62 and accompanying text. 
22. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 nn.6–8, 1768 (2004) (listing 
several theories). 
23. Campbell, supra note 8, at 262. 
24. To be sure, a minority of Republicans made theory-based arguments that have become 
significant to our modern constitutional ethos. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 38, 119, 245 (1993) (drawing on James Madison’s ideas). 
25. See infra subpart IV(B). 
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Two points deserve emphasis up front. First, although the term “rights” had 
a variety of meanings, rights generally were not the inverse of powers, 
disabling the government from acting within an entire field. Second, the 
Speech and Press Clauses were designed to provide protections at the federal 
level that were equivalent to those created at the state level by state bills of 
rights. The constitutional arguments levied a decade later by Republicans 
against the Sedition Act were thus doubly innovative. 
But rights discourse in the late 1780s provides more than just a contrast 
to arguments against the Sedition Act a decade later. The prevailing 
conception of rights at the Founding also helps reveal how and why 
Republicans were able to invent an entirely new understanding of the First 
Amendment in so little time. Again, two points deserve emphasis. First, 
speech and press freedoms empowered juries to decide cases involving 
governmental restrictions of expression. This feature put extraordinary 
pressure on Republicans to come up with a new understanding of the First 
Amendment once the protection of a jury in sedition cases was, in their view, 
undermined by the partisan selection of jurors. Second, and more 
fundamentally, the philosophical ideas underpinning American thinking 
about rights had inculcated flexible and dynamic interpretive ideas among 
the Founders. And these older habits of mind lingered late into the 1790s, 
even as Americans increasingly framed their constitutional arguments in 
fixed terms. 
A. Eighteenth-Century Rights 
Founding Era constitutionalism was grounded in social-contract 
theory.26 This theory was premised on a thought experiment designed to 
reveal the purposes and limits of governmental authority. It did so by asking, 
hypothetically, what would lead individuals to form a political community in 
the first place—an agreement known as a “social compact” or “social 
contract.” After creating a body politic, the theory went, the people would 
then agree to form a government through an instrument known as a 
“constitution.”27 
American understandings of rights in the late 1780s flowed from this 
theory. All individuals, social-contract theory posited, surrendered some of 
their “natural rights”—or their rights to life, liberty, and property in an 
imagined “state of nature”28—for the greater security of those rights as a 
 
26. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 
85, 87–88 (2017). 
27. Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights “Retained” 
by the People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 267, 271 (1992); see also sources cited infra note 29. 
28. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (ratified 1780) (“All men . . . have certain natural, 
essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending 
their lives and liberties; [and] that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property . . . .”), amended 
by MASS. CONST. amend. CVI; see also MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, THE NATURAL RIGHTS REPUBLIC: 
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whole. The point of retaining natural rights, however, was not to make certain 
aspects of natural liberty immune from governmental regulation. Rather, 
retained natural rights were aspects of natural liberty that could be restricted 
only with just cause and only with consent of the body politic.29 Natural rights 
retained by the people were subject to regulation by the people. 
It was impractical, of course, for the entire body of the people to exercise 
power directly, so Americans looked to representative institutions for that 
purpose. Not surprisingly, the most important representative institutions were 
legislatures, and retained natural liberty could therefore be restricted pursuant 
to law. William Blackstone summed it up nicely in his Commentaries, 
remarking that the natural right “of acting as one thinks fit” is exchanged for 
civil liberty, which “is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human 
laws . . . as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the 
public.”30 
But legislatures were not the only representative bodies. Juries, too, 
served in a representative capacity. In modern constitutional law, we tend to 
think of juries as factfinding bodies and jury rights as procedural 
safeguards.31 Juries in the eighteenth century, however, were not simply, or 
even primarily, empaneled to protect criminal defendants and civil litigants. 
Rather, jurors acted as representatives of the entire political society.32 As 
John Adams privately noted, “the People are by the Constitution appointed 
to take [part], in the passing and Execution of Laws.”33 In an overstated but 
revealing comment, Thomas Jefferson went even further: “Were I called 
upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or 
 
STUDIES IN THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 77–82 (1996) (exploring 
the treatment of these concepts in the writings of Thomas Jefferson). 
29. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 92–98 (exploring this concept); Hamburger, supra note 8, 
at 909 (same); Barry A. Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the Declaration of Independence (same), 
in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 116, 132, 139–41 (Barry 
Alan Shain ed., 2007); see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 272 n.114 (collecting additional sources). 
30. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121. 
31. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (2004) (noting this view). 
32. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of Juries (explaining this view in connection to social-contract 
theory), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 954, 960 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall, 
eds., 2007); see also KRAMER, supra note 31, at 70 (“[T]he eighteenth-century view was more 
complex.”); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 295 (1996) (“[R]epresentation and jury trial were dual securities for . . . personal 
rights.”); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 50–52 (1986) (surveying eighteenth-century views of juries); William 
Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case 
of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 536 (2007) (discussing the representative view of 
juries). 
33. John Adams, Diary Notes on the Right of Juries (Feb. 12, 1771) (emphasis added), in 1 
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 228 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). 
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Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the 
Legislative.”34 
Because the natural rights of life, liberty, and property could be 
restricted only with the consent of the body politic, juries were integral to the 
American legal system.35 “Juries are taken by Lot or by Suffrage from the 
Mass of the People,” Adams declared, “and no Man can be condemned of 
Life, or Limb, or Property or Reputation, without the Concurrence of the 
Voice of the People.”36 This view was conventional. “Juries are constantly 
and frequently drawn from the body of the people, and freemen of the 
country,” Federal Farmer later explained, “and by holding the jury’s right to 
return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, 
their just and rightful controul in the judicial department.”37 
According to social-contract theory, the creation of a body politic set the 
stage for a “constitution” in which the people created a government by 
majority consent.38 In the English tradition, the constitution was customary, 
stemming from longstanding traditions and an assortment of seminal 
documents.39 And these customary protections included a variety of 
“constitutional” or “fundamental” positive rights that were defined in terms 
of governmental authority. Notably, some of these rules, like the right to a 
jury trial and the rule against ex post facto laws, limited how the government 
could restrict natural liberty. 
Social-contract theory thus shaped American thinking about rights, and 
the following subpart will discuss speech and press freedoms in particular. 
 
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). 
35. See, e.g., Virginia Assembly Debates (Dec. 14, 1798) (statement of Del. George K. Taylor) 
(“[N]atural rights . . . could not be deprived . . . without a trial by Jury.”), in DEBATES IN THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, UPON CERTAIN RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE HOUSE, UPON 
THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF THE ACTS OF CONGRESS PASSED AT THEIR LAST SESSION, 
COMMONLY CALLED, THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 18 (Richmond, Thomas Nicolson 1818) 
[hereinafter DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA]. 
36. Adams, supra note 33, at 229. 
37. FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER XV TO THE REPUBLIC (1788), reprinted in 20 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1043, 1048–49 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 2004). 
38. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *52 (“[A] state is a collective 
body . . . [that] can therefore be no otherwise produced than by a political union; by the consent of 
all persons . . . according to [the state’s] constitution[] . . . .”); John Adams, Preliminary 
Observations (“The first ‘collection’ of authority must be an unanimous agreement to form 
themselves into a nation, people, community, or body politic . . . .”), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 299, 301 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1851); James Madison, 
Sovereignty (“[L]et us consult the Theory which contemplates a certain number of individuals as 
meeting and agreeing to form one political society, in order that the rights the safety & the interest 
of each may be under the safeguard of the whole.”), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 568, 
570 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
39. See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 4 vols. (1986–1993) (comparing British and American constitutional thought). For a 
shorter discussion, see KRAMER, supra note 31, at 9–34. 
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But another point is worth emphasis. Social-contract theory trained 
Americans to think and speak about foundational principles in potentially 
conflicting terms. 
On the one hand, social-contract theory prized arguments about the 
happiness of the political society as a whole—a highly underdeterminate 
standard that created substantial room for debate. As Joseph Priestley noted, 
there was “a real difficulty in determining what general rules, respecting the 
extent of the power of government, or of governors, are most conducive to 
the public good.”40 The social contract, we must remember, was not a real 
agreement; its content was determined by abstract reasoning. This gave the 
social contract a dynamic, evolutionary character. 
At the same time, however, the Founders often talked about the social 
contract as if it were a historical agreement.41 They often debated its content, 
for instance, by invoking what the common law had been since “time 
immemorial,” even without any historical basis for those claims.42 Moreover, 
many Founders thought that one of the most reliable ways of ascertaining the 
dictates of reason was by looking to the lessons of experience, and 
particularly the customary traditions of the common law.43 Founding Era 
constitutionalism thus trained Americans to think and speak about 
foundational principles in potentially conflicting ways. Republicans would 
take that training to heart a decade later. 
B. Speech and Press Freedoms 
The Founders often described the freedom of speaking, writing, and 
publishing as a retained natural right.44 Ordinarily, as we have seen, such 
“rights” were subject to legislative restrictions that promoted the public good. 
Unsurprisingly, then, English and American law recognized plenty of 
limitations on speech through rules against defamation, blasphemy, perjury, 
profane swearing, and so forth.45 A series of restrictive English efforts to 
 
40. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE 
NATURE OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 59 (London, J. Dodsley et al. 1768). 
41. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of Citizens and Aliens (describing the formation of the social 
contract historically but then discerning the terms of the social contract through reasoning, not 
historical inquiry), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 32, at 1038, 1045; 
Brutus II, N.Y.J., Nov. 1, 1787 (same), reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 154, 154–55 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003). 
42. See REID, supra note 32, at 28–40 (reviewing the concept of “immemoriality”). 
43. Campbell, supra note 8, at 290–92. 
44. See id. at 265 n.73 (collecting sources). 
45. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals (discussing limits of the 
freedom of speech), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 32, at 1053, 1066; 
William Livingston, Of the Use, Abuse, and Liberty of the Press, INDEP. REFLECTOR (N.Y.C.), Aug. 
30, 1753 (“Civil Liberty is built upon a Surrender of so much of our natural Liberty, as is necessary 
for the good Ends of Government; and the Liberty of the Press, is always to be restricted from 
becoming a Prejudice to the public Weal.”), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER 
TO JEFFERSON 75, 79 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Carolina Acad. Press 1996); Jacob Rush, The Nature 
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insulate the government from public criticism, however, led political 
theorists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to view the freedom of 
speaking, writing, and publishing as vital to representative government. 
Particularly important in this effort were the widely read essays that 
John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon published under the pseudonym Cato 
in the early 1720s. In his essay, “Of Freedom of Speech,” Gordon highlighted 
the connection between public discussion and republican government: 
That men ought to speak well of their governors, is true, while their 
governors deserve to be well spoken of; but to do publick mischief, 
without hearing of it, is only the prerogative and felicity of tyranny: A 
free people will be shewing that they are so, by their freedom of 
speech. 
 The administration of government is nothing else, but the 
attendance of the trustees of the people upon the interest and affairs of 
the people. And as it is the part and business of the people, for whose 
sake alone all publick matters are, or ought to be, transacted, to see 
whether they be well or ill transacted; so it is the interest, and ought to 
be the ambition, of all honest magistrates, to have their deeds openly 
examined, and publickly scanned . . . .46 
Gordon essentially argued that overregulation of speech was against the 
public interest because it deprived the public of useful, perhaps even 
essential, information about their government. 
This understanding of the freedom of speech, viewed through the lens 
of popular sovereignty, dominated American discourse about the right. “The 
citizen under a free government,” James Wilson explained in his law lectures, 
“has a right to think, to speak, to write, to print, and to publish freely, but 
with decency and truth, concerning publick men, publick bodies, and publick 
measures.”47 Others widely agreed that open public discussion was essential 
to republican government.48 
To be sure, not all criticism of government was okay. Carefully 
delineated governmental power to punish sedition, for instance, was usually 
accepted even among otherwise “liberal” writers like Cato.49 For most 
 
of an Oath Stated and Explained (Aug. 8, 1796) (defending bans on profane swearing because it 
“lessen[s] that awe and reverence of the Supreme Being, which is one of the strongest guards against 
perjury; and consequently be in a high degree injurious to society”), in CHARGES AND EXTRACTS 
OF CHARGES, ON MORAL AND RELIGIOUS SUBJECTS 25, 31 (Phila., D. Hogan 1803). 
46. [THOMAS GORDON], OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THAT THE SAME IS INSEPARABLE FROM 
PUBLICK LIBERTY (1720), reprinted in 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO’S 
LETTERS: OR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 110, 
111 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995). 
47. WILSON, supra note 41, at 1046. 
48. See BUEL, supra note 6, at 93–112 (esp. 93), 128–35, 244–61 (esp. 250, 255–57) (offering 
a balanced assessment of Federalist views). 
49. For recognitions of the general approval of sedition laws in the eighteenth century, see 
BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 2; HOFFER, supra note 6, at 139; LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF 
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people, the right to make well-intentioned statements hardly included a 
corollary right to deceive others. Nonetheless, Americans recognized the 
importance of remaining vigilant against governmental efforts to suppress 
dissent under the pretext of fighting sedition. In an essay written after he 
successfully defended John Peter Zenger against charges of sedition, James 
Alexander explained that 
abuses of the Freedom of Speech are the excrescences of Liberty. They 
ought to be suppressed; but to whom dare we commit the care of doing 
it? An evil Magistrate entrusted with a power to punish Words is 
armed with a Weapon the most destructive and terrible. Under 
pretense of pruning off the exuberant branches, he frequently destroys 
the tree.50 
The English and American response was a constitutional right commonly 
known as the liberty of the press. 
The liberty of the press put juries in control of governmental efforts to 
regulate expression. First, the principle barred the government from 
instituting a licensing regime—the famous rule against “previous restraints 
upon publications”51—meaning that jurors rather than governmental censors 
would have the final word on efforts to control publishing. “The liberty of 
the press, as established in England,” Jean Louis de Lolme explained, ensured 
that libel prosecutions would “proceed by the Trial by Jury.”52 
Controversially, William Blackstone argued that the right afforded no 
“freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”53 But American 
views were more complex. Juries had the power to give general verdicts, and 
many Americans thought that the truth of putatively seditious statements was 
a proper ground for acquittal.54 
 
SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 10 (1960) 
[hereinafter LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION]; Berns, supra note 13, at 134; Bogen, supra note 8, 
at 462; Hamburger, supra note 8, at 910–11; Philip B. Kurland, The Original Understanding of the 
Freedom of the Press Provision of the First Amendment, 55 MISS. L.J. 225, 252 (1985); and Rabban, 
supra note 8, at 810, 823. The acceptance of sedition laws, however, was by no means unanimous. 
In a revised and retitled version of his pathbreaking and controversial book, Legacy of Suppression, 
Leonard Levy offered contradictory remarks about the original meaning of the First Amendment. 
LEVY, supra note 8, at 272–74. 
50. James Alexander, Letter to the Editor, Free Speech Is a Pillar of Free Government, PA. 
GAZETTE (Phila.), Nov. 17, 1737, reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO 
JEFFERSON, supra note 45, at 62, 62–63. 
51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52. 
52. JEAN-LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND, OR AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 283 (London, T. Spilsbury 1775). 
53. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52. Notably, however, Blackstone 
assumed that “the object of legal punishment” was “the disseminating or making public of bad 
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society” and that “to censure the licentiousness is to maintain 
the liberty of the press.” Id. at *152–53. 
54. This issue remained contested for a long time. See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to William 
Cushing (Mar. 7, 1789) (“The difficult and important question is whether the Truth of words can be 
admitted by the court to be given in evidence to the jury, upon a plea of not guilty?”), in FREEDOM 
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Juries thus linked the common law right of press freedom to the retained 
natural right of speaking, publishing, and writing—together guaranteeing 
popular control over any efforts to abridge expression. Only one early state 
constitution explicitly recognized both principles. The Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 declared that “the people have a right to freedom of 
speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom 
of the press ought not to be restrained.”55 Meanwhile, constitutions in other 
states mentioned only the liberty of the press.56 But by maintaining a 
republican form of government and ensuring the right to a jury trial, other 
states implicitly protected unmentioned natural rights, including the freedom 
of speaking, writing, and publishing. 
Founding Era discussions of the liberty of the press thus reflect a foreign 
way of thinking. From our modern perspective, speech and press freedoms 
operate primarily as substantive limits on legislative power. The government 
cannot regulate speech based on the viewpoint being expressed; restrictions 
of speech based on its communicative content are presumptively 
unconstitutional; and so forth.57 Moreover, because expressive freedom 
operates as a set of substantive legal rules, judges are specially charged with 
ensuring that the government stays within its proper legal limits.58 
From this perspective, scholars have voiced exasperation with the idea 
that the freedom of the press was confined to a rule against prior restraints. 
Limiting regulations of expression to lawful restraints, Wendell Bird writes, 
would have made press freedom “nothing but a tautology.”59 Indeed, defining 
expressive freedom in a way that lacked substantive content would be 
directly contrary to the modern definition of constitutional rights. 
In the eighteenth century, however, it was anything but a tautology to 
 
OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, supra note 45, at 152, 153; Kate Elizabeth Brown, 
Rethinking People v. Croswell: Alexander Hamilton and the Nature and Scope of “Common Law” 
in the Early Republic, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 611, 612–13, 639–41 (2014) (recounting a famous 
1803–1804 New York controversy over the truth defense). American judges sometimes ruled that 
“a defendant could establish the truth of the publication only to show that he lacked the requisite 
malicious intent.” David Jenkins, The Sedition Act of 1798 and the Incorporation of Seditious Libel 
into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 154, 192 (2001). 
55. PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, art. XII. Vermont, which was not yet recognized as an American 
state, also mentioned the freedom of speech in its constitution. See VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. 
XV (“That the people have a right of freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their 
sentiments, concerning the transactions of government—and therefore the freedom of the press 
ought not to be restrained.”). 
56. Anderson, supra note 8, at 464–65, app. at 538–41. 
57. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 406, 420 (1989). 
58. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (“Judges, 
as expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is 
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any [defamation] judgment that 
is not supported by clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’”). 
59. WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: THE EARLY SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT 11 (2016). 
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affirm that the government could restrict natural liberty only pursuant to laws 
passed by a representative legislature and enforced by a jury. Founding Era 
constitutional thought, after all, was obsessed with the dangers of unbounded 
governmental discretion, particularly when public officials had their own 
interests at stake. Consequently, acting pursuant to known laws passed and 
executed with popular consent was, as Alexander Hamilton put it, “the very 
essence of civil liberty” and the antithesis of arbitrary rule.60 
The need for representative control over the creation and execution of 
law was especially profound in the context of sedition because of a famed 
axiom in eighteenth-century constitutional thought: “No man is allowed to 
be a judge in his own cause.”61 When someone criticized the government, the 
Founders widely thought, it would be downright dangerous to give agents of 
the government, including prosecutors and judges, the power to punish 
governmental critics. In this context, giving power to juries was crucial. 
Commentators during the ratification debates explicitly linked jury 
rights to concerns about governmental suppression of dissent. The 
“interposition of a jury,” one writer explained, was an essential shield against 
self-interested prosecutions: 
The Chief Magistrate, or the Legislature itself, of a republic, is as 
liable to personal prejudice, and to passion, as any King in Europe; 
and might prosecute a bold writer, or any other person, who had 
become obnoxious to their resentment, with as much violence and 
rigour. What so admirable a barrier to defend the innocent, and protect 
the weak from the attacks of power, as the interposition of a jury? In 
this respect, the trial by jury may well be called the palladium of 
liberty.62 
 
60. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 100 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961); see REID, supra note 16, at 38–39 
(explaining the eighteenth-century conception of arbitrary rule); see also HAMILTON, supra, at 100 
(“When any people are ruled by laws, in framing which, they have no part, that are to bind them, to 
all intents and purposes, without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are 
in the strictest sense slaves, and the government with respect to them, is despotic.”).  
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 19, at 59 (James Madison); accord, e.g., Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“[A] law that makes a man a Judge in 
his own cause . . . is against all reason and justice . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 19, 
at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) (“No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”). 
Indeed, the rule that no man should judge his own cause was the foundation of one of Edward 
Coke’s most famous decisions. See Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652; 8 Co. Rep. 
107 a, 118 a (“[O]ne cannot be Judge and attorney for any of the parties . . . .”); see also R.H. 
Helmholz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 
335 (2009) (“There is no doubt . . . that acting as a judge in one’s own cause had long been regarded 
as a violation of the law of nature.”). 
62. A NATIVE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 2, at 686. As Theophilus Parsons proclaimed during the 
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention: 
Let him be considered as a criminal by the general government, yet only his own fellow 
citizens can convict him—they are his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not 
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Jury protections were essential, another Anti-Federalist exclaimed, because 
the government “will easily find pretexts” to restrain “what it may please 
them to call—the licentiousness of the press.”63 As Virginia lawyer 
Alexander White summarized, “should I be unjustly accused of [sedition], 
the trial by a jury of my countrymen is my security.”64 
These writers could hardly anticipate what lay ahead. The emergence of 
political parties, combined with the power of the federal administration to 
hand select jurors in key states, would soon undermine the sanctified status 
of juries as neutral arbiters in sedition cases. 
C. The First Amendment 
Late in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, a few delegates pushed for 
a guarantee of the liberty of the press, but these proposals were narrowly 
defeated.65 The Constitution thus emerged without any express protections 
for the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing, or for the liberty of the 
press. As it turned out, the omission of a bill of rights became one of the most 
contentious issues during the ratification contest. 
A complete review of the ratification debates is unnecessary, but a few 
points are worth highlighting. First, although the Anti-Federalists made all 
sorts of creative arguments against ratification, nobody seems to have 
mentioned that the Constitution would threaten the retained natural right to 
the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing.66 This silence did not stop 
 
all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce 
him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation. 
Massachusetts Ratification Convention Debates (Jan. 23, 1788) (statement of Theophilus Parsons), 
in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1313, 1328 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000); see also, e.g., [Samuel Bryan], Centinel I, INDEP. 
GAZETTEER (Phila.), Oct. 5, 1787 (“[I]f I use my pen with the boldness of a freeman, it is because 
I know that the liberty of the press yet remains unviolated, and juries yet are judges.”), reprinted in 
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 158, 159 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976); Letter from John Adams to William Cushing, supra note 54, at 153 (“[I]f the jury 
found [the putatively libelous statements] true and that they were published for the Public good, 
they would readily acquit.”). 
63. Cincinnatus I: To James Wilson, Esquire, N.Y.J., Nov. 1, 1787 [hereinafter Cincinnatus I], 
reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 41, at 160, 163. 
64. Alexander White, To the Citizens of Virginia, WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE, Feb. 22, 1788, 
reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 402, 
405 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988). 
65. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 341, 587–88, 617 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911). 
66. Using the Pennsylvania Constitution as a template, several state ratification conventions 
mentioned the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing in a preamble to their recognition of 
the liberty of the press. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, 
AND ORIGINS 93 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (proposals of North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, 
and the Pennsylvania minority); see also The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, 
VA. INDEP. CHRON. (Richmond), Apr. 30, 1788 (“That the people have a right to the freedom of 
speech, of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore printing presses shall not be subject to 
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Alexander Hamilton and his friends from lambasting Anti-Federalists for 
misunderstanding the protection for rights in republican governments. Where 
the people retain sovereignty, Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 84, “in 
strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they 
have no need of particular reservations.”67 But if Hamilton was referring to 
speech freedom, he was responding to a straw man; the freedom of speech 
was ignored during the ratification controversy.68 
The omission of a clause protecting the liberty of the press, by contrast, 
was one of the leading Anti-Federalist objections. Significantly, however, 
nobody seems to have advocated for the liberty of the press as a way of 
uniquely constraining federal authority relative to state authority. That is, 
there is no evidence of anyone suggesting that a federal ban on abridging the 
liberty of the press would take a different meaning than its state counterparts. 
To be sure, Federalists occasionally asserted that the new government would 
have no authority over the press under Article I.69 (More commonly, 
however, Federalists simply denied that any government could abrogate 
fundamental positive rights.70) And Anti-Federalist “references to press 
freedom were usually cursory, with no elaboration about what the term meant 
or what a declaration in its favor would accomplish.”71 Nonetheless, 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike never suggested that federal protection 
 
restraint, other than liableness to legal prosecution, for false facts printed and published.”), reprinted 
in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 
769, 773. 
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton). 
68. See, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (statement of Patrick 
Henry) (mentioning only press freedom), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1299, 1332 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1993); FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER VI TO THE REPUBLIC (1788) (same), in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 979, 985; see also 
Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of the 
Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (2011) (“As for freedom of speech, anti-Federalists 
said virtually nothing about it.”). To be fair to Hamilton, Anti-Federalists had voiced concerns about 
all sorts of infractions on other forms of retained natural liberty. See Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial 
Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–17 (1994) (describing Anti-Federalists’ appeals for a 
“remarkably long list of rights,” even including a right to hunt). 
69. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 300 n.242 (collecting sources). 
70. E.g., A CITIZEN OF NEW YORK [JOHN JAY], AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK (1788), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 922, 933; Foederal Constitution, PA. GAZETTE (Phila.), Oct. 
10, 1787, reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 362, 363–64 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); Uncus, MD. J. 
(Balt.), Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 76, 78 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983). 
71. Campbell, supra note 8, at 296. 
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for the liberty of the press would somehow be more capacious than its state-
level counterparts.72 
Indeed, the principal Anti-Federalist argument was that the federal 
constitution—just like state constitutions—ought to mention fundamental 
rights like press freedom. “The powers, rights, and authority, granted to the 
general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect to 
every object to which they extend, as that of any state government,” Brutus 
explained.73 To Anti-Federalists, parity in the means of federal and state 
power warranted the enumeration of the same rights at both levels. 
Over time, some Federalists recognized merit in that argument.74 
Among them, most significantly, was James Madison, who emphasized this 
point in his speech on June 8, 1789, introducing a set of amendments to the 
House of Representatives. Although congressional powers were limited, 
Madison explained, Congress had “certain discretionary powers with respect 
to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same 
manner as the powers of the State Governments under their constitutions may 
to an indefinite extent.”75 Thus, the people would benefit from having their 
rights guarded against federal power, too. 
For the most part, Madison’s push for amendments met with Federalist 
indifference, and congressional debates on the topic are largely 
unilluminating.76 Strikingly, however, nobody so much as hinted that 
proposed federal protections for expression might differ in meaning from 
their state counterparts. Indeed, Madison’s draft followed nearly word-for-
word the language and structure of Pennsylvania’s speech and press clauses: 
“The people,” Madison proposed, “shall not be deprived or abridged of their 
right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the 
 
72. Support for this statement comes from the author’s review of every mention of the word 
“press” in the first twenty-four volumes of The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution. 
73. Brutus II, supra note 41, at 156; see also, e.g., Cincinnatus I, supra note 63, at 162 (“The 
conventions that made the state and the general constitutions, sprang from the same source, were 
delegated for the same purpose . . . .”). 
74. Thomas Jefferson may deserve some credit for stimulating shifts in Madison’s views. See, 
e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789) (“[I]n a constitutive act which 
leaves some precious articles unnoticed, and raises implications against others, a declaration of 
rights becomes necessary by way of supplement.”), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659, 
660 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 443–46 (2010) (summarizing Jefferson’s correspondence with 
Madison over adding a declaration of rights). 
75. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). The editors of the 
Annals of Congress published two versions of the first two volumes. These versions have different 
pagination but identical title pages, making it necessary to distinguish them by the page headings 
(“History of Congress” or “Gales & Seaton’s History of Debates in Congress”) rather than 
publication details. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 91 n.27. Citations in this Article are to the 
“History of Congress” volumes. 
76. See Rabban, supra note 8, at 814 (“[T]he few congressional comments on the proposed first 
amendment were brief, ambiguous, and apathetic.” (citing LEVY, supra note 8)). 
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press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”77 The final 
House version was shorter—simply declaring that “[t]he freedom of speech, 
and of the press . . . shall not be infringed”—but again without any suggestion 
of a novel meaning.78 Again, the whole impetus for enumerating rights at the 
federal level was to recognize “simple, acknowledged principles” that states 
had already widely embraced.79 
Indeed, decisive evidence points in the opposite direction. When it first 
endorsed the Speech and Press Clauses, the House also passed an amendment 
providing, “No State shall infringe . . . the freedom of speech, or of the 
press.”80 This provision reinforces that the First Amendment did not 
withdraw all federal authority to regulate expression. Put simply, “If 
infringements of speech and press freedoms arose from any controls over 
expression, then this proposal would have barred state laws against 
defamation, conspiracy, threats, profanity, blasphemy, perjury, sedition, and 
so forth.”81 No evidence suggests that any congressman, much less a majority 
of the House, had such a radical agenda in mind.82 The First Amendment and 
its state-restricting counterpart thus did not, at least in the view of the House, 
categorically bar governmental control over expression.83 
Nor does the language of the First Amendment suggest a lack of federal 
power over expression. Scholars who defend that position often point to the 
First Amendment’s opening phrase, “Congress shall make no law . . . .”84 
 
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). Pennsylvania’s 
constitution specified that “the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and 
publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the press ought not to be restrained.” PA. 
CONST. of 1776, ch. I, art. XII. 
78. House Committee Report (July 28, 1789), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 27, 28 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & 
Helen E. Veit eds., 1986). 
79. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 738 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). 
80. House Resolution and Articles of Amendment (Aug. 24, 1789) (emphasis added), in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
supra note 78, at 35, 39. 
81. Campbell, supra note 8, at 313. 
82. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 502, 508 (refuting the notion that any of the Framers 
considered the Speech and Press Clauses to be absolute prohibitions); Bogen, supra note 8, at 458 
n.143 (“Because no one spoke against the adoption of a guarantee of freedom of speech and of the 
press as placing too strong a limit on government . . . any notion that the framers intended all 
statements to be immune from federal prosecution is hard to credit.”). 
83. Some modern textualists would endorse this use of “drafting history” arguments. See John 
F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 737 n.272 (1997) 
(“[T]extualist judges . . . do not categorically exclude a statute’s drafting evolution from their 
consideration of statutory context.”); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 361 
(2005) (“[M]any textualists use records of a bill’s drafting history . . . to shed light on how members 
of the enacting legislature understood the resulting statute . . . .”). Notably, Congress has 
constitutional authority to draft and propose amendments, whereas the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787, whose then-secretive proceedings are afforded less weight in modern originalist theory, was 
not authorized to draft the Constitution. 
84. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From 
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Simply put, however, a ban on passing laws that abridge a certain right in no 
way suggests a lack of power to pass laws that do not abridge that right. If 
anything, the appropriate inference at the Founding was precisely the 
opposite, thus supporting an inference that federal authority included at least 
some room for regulating expression.85 
Before turning to the 1790s, it is worth pausing a moment to consider 
the First Congress’s treatment of another form of natural liberty: religious 
freedom. In the 1780s, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had creatively 
argued that the retained natural right of freedom of conscience meant “that 
Religion is wholly exempt from [governmental] cognizance.”86 Relying on 
this position, scholars have read the First Amendment as following this 
categorical (some say “jurisdictional”) approach to natural rights, thus 
completely depriving the government of all authority with respect to 
religion.87 Republicans, too, frequently invoked religious freedom during the 
Sedition Act debates in support of their innovative reading of the First 
Amendment.88 
Although Jefferson and Madison’s “jurisdictional” arguments about 
religious freedom surely informed their responses to the Sedition Act, there 
are compelling reasons to doubt that it reflected their thinking about 
expressive freedom in 1789, much less the thinking of their contemporaries. 
First, the “jurisdictional” argument was highly creative.89 “Retaining” natural 
 
the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 791 (2008) 
(“The introductory clause, ‘Congress shall make no law,’ which originated in the Senate, exactly 
paralleled the Federalist position on the press clause; that there was no affirmative power in the 
Constitution that granted Congress the ability to regulate the press.”); Leonard W. Levy, 
Introduction (citing the introductory clause for the view that Congress was “totally without power 
to enact legislation respecting the press”), in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON, 
supra note 45, at xix, lvi–lvii. 
85. See infra note 266 (collecting sources). 
86. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (ca. June 20, 
1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
Jefferson articulated the idea in a draft bill that Virginia’s legislature did not end up passing until 
1786. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in 2 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
87. E.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1113 (1994); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, 
James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 23 (2003). 
88. See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2105 (1798) (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Macon) (“[I]f a 
law like this was passed, to abridge the liberty of the press, Congress would have the same right to 
pass a law making an establishment of religion, or to prohibit its free exercise . . . .”); id. at 2153 
(statement of Rep. Edward Livingston) (“Gentlemen may tomorrow establish a national religion 
agreeably to the opinion of a majority of this House . . . . The doing of this is not less forbidden than 
the act which the House are about to do.”). 
89. See Philip A. Hamburger, Equality and Diversity: The Eighteenth-Century Debate About 
Equal Protection and Equal Civil Rights, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 353 (calling such arguments 
“unconventional”). Some earlier commentators took the same position as Jefferson, e.g., RONALD 
M. PETERS, JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT 79–86 (1974), 
but this was decidedly a “minority point of view,” id. at 86. 
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rights, after all, did not bar their regulation through law. Liberty and property, 
for example, were retained natural rights, but nobody viewed these freedoms 
as beyond governmental control. So, too, with religion. American states 
broadly recognized the inalienable natural right of conscience—a firm ban 
on direct punishment of religious belief—while simultaneously maintaining 
a diverse array of rules that dealt with religion, including religious taxes and 
religious qualifications for holding public office. 
Moreover, Madison and his colleagues in the First Congress—many of 
whom were paranoid about protecting state establishments—never suggested 
that their proposed state-restraining amendment, which guaranteed a right of 
free exercise against state governments, might stealthily ban all remaining 
state support for religion.90 Rather, that proposal strongly indicates that the 
natural-rights guarantees in the First Amendment—including the protections 
for speech and conscience91—did not categorically deprive the federal 
government of authority with respect to those topics. 
In any event, whatever one thinks of the meaning of speech and press 
freedoms in the late 1780s, the simple fact remains that nobody so much as 
hinted that a guarantee of those rights in the federal constitution had a 
“jurisdictional” meaning, whereas analogous provisions in state constitutions 
left ample room for state governments to regulate harmful speech. In other 
words, no one in the 1780s articulated the interpretation of the federal Speech 
and Press Clauses that Republicans invented a decade later. Many aspects of 
Founding Era thought were contested or unclear,92 but this was not one of 
them. The Founders were not imposing a categorical ban on federal power 
over expression, and they did not suggest that the federal Speech and Press 




90. Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 371, 379–86. As Snee observes, “It is indeed stressing the obvious to conclude that, in 
[Madison’s] mind at least, . . . the establishment of a religion by law is not per se an infringement 
of the equal rights of conscience.” Id. at 384. I agree, although it seems possible that Madison 
proposed the clause with awareness that he or others might use it as a basis for disestablishmentarian 
arguments. 
91. James Madison, Notes for Speech in Congress (June 8, 1789) (“[N]atural rights, retained—
as Speech, Con[science.]”), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 193, 194 (Charles F. Hobson & 
Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979); Proposal by Roger Sherman to House Committee of Eleven (July 
21–28, 1789) (“[C]ertain natural rights which are retained . . . [include] the right of conscience . . . 
[and the right] of Speaking, writing and publishing . . . with decency and freedom . . . .”), in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 66, at 83, 
83. 
92. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 567 
(2006). 
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II. The Cabell Affair 
Though originally unanticipated, partisan divisions emerged quickly in 
the 1790s. By the time John Adams became President in 1797, a genuine 
crisis had emerged. Federalists were convinced that their Republican 
opponents were staging an American sequel to France’s disastrous 
revolution. Meanwhile, Republicans saw themselves as the heirs of ‘76 and 
the true voice of the people, with Federalists (in their view) busy 
reestablishing ties with Great Britain and planning to inaugurate an American 
monarchy.93 
The ongoing European wars exacerbated these conflicts, and Federalists 
often jumped at the chance to label their opponents as disloyal French 
stooges. In his inaugural address on March 4, 1797, John Adams decried “the 
pestilence of foreign influence, which is the angel of destruction to elective 
governments.”94 Just two months later, Adams delivered another rousing 
speech urging Congress to prepare for war in response to French attacks on 
American shipping.95 “It must not be permitted to be doubted,” Adams stated, 
“whether the people of the United States will support the government 
established by their voluntary consent, and appointed by their free choice” or 
surrender to “foreign and domestic factions, in opposition to their own 
government.”96 
Republicans pleaded that Federalists had already succumbed to British 
interests in the Jay Treaty. Particularly outspoken was Virginia Congressman 
Samuel Jordan Cabell, who harangued Federalists in rambling yet colorful 
public letters to his constituents. American capitulation to Britain and 
belligerency toward France, he wrote in January 1797, was “sapping the 
foundation of that illumined pyramid of liberty” and “thereby hastening with 
a precipitancy and frantic rage only to be equalled by its depravity and 
madness, the attainment of the darling wish of the aristocracy in this country, 
the establishment of monarchy.”97 Americans, he ominously declared, “are 
furiously hurling ourselves into the vortex of tyranny.”98 Cabell’s remarks 
 
93. For discussions of the emerging political parties of the 1790s, see generally NOBLE E. 
CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICANS: THE FORMATION OF PARTY 
ORGANIZATION, 1789-1801 (1957); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF 
FEDERALISM (1993); and SHARP, supra note 11. 
94. John Adams, Inaugural Speech to Both Houses of Congress (Mar. 4, 1797), in 9 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 105, 109 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1854). 
For French political meddling, see ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 93, at 341–65, 520–21. 
95. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE 
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797-1801, at 8–11 (1966). 
96. John Adams, Speech to Both Houses of Congress (May 16, 1797), in 9 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 94, at 111, 118. 
97. Circular Letter from Samuel Jordan Cabell (Jan. 12, 1797), in 1 CIRCULAR LETTERS OF 
CONGRESSMEN TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS 1789–1829, at 67, 69 (Noble E. Cunningham, Jr. ed., 
1978). 
98. Id. 
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were typical of 1790s politics, but they soon garnered attention in an unusual 
forum: the federal circuit court in Richmond. 
A. The Presentment 
“The object” of a grand jury’s duties, Justice James Iredell announced 
to the seventeen grand jurors assembled in Richmond on May 22, 1797, “is 
the preservation of a union.”99 Iredell, continuing a tradition of giving 
political lectures in the form of jury charges,100 echoed Adams’s complaints 
about partisan conflict. “This country has great energies for defence, and by 
supporting each other might defy the world,” he announced. “But if we 
disunite, if we suffer differences of opinion to corrode into enmity, . . . we 
must expect nothing but a fate as ruinous as it would be disgraceful, that of 
inviting some foreign nation to foment and take advantage of our internal 
discords.”101 Iredell concluded with an ominous warning: “So critical and 
peculiar is our situation, that nothing can save us from this as well as every 
other external danger, but constant vigilance.”102 
The grand jury returned a presentment that took up Iredell’s provocative 
invitation: 
We of the grand Jury of the United States for the District of Virginia, 
present as a real evil the circular Letters of several members of the late 
Congress, and particularly Letters with the Signature of Samuel J. 
Cabell, endeavouring at a time of real public danger, to disseminate 
unfounded calumnies against the happy Government of the United 
States, and thereby to separate the people therefrom, and to encrease 
or produce a foreign influence ruinous to the peace, happiness and 
independence of these United States.103 
Newspapers soon published the presentment along with Iredell’s charge.104 
The impact was electric. “The presentment going in the public papers just at 
the moment when Congress was together,” Jefferson wrote to Madison, 
“produced a great effect both on its friends and foes in that body, very much 
to the disheartening and mortification of the latter.”105 
 
99. James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland 
(May 8, 1797) [hereinafter James Iredell’s Charge], in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 173, 177. Iredell’s 
Richmond charge included minor revisions but none pertinent to this part of his charge. See id. at 
173 nn.1–7 (noting the differences). 
100. See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 126–29 (1995) (providing examples). 
101. James Iredell’s Charge, supra note 99, at 177. 
102. Id. 
103. Presentment of the Grand Jury, supra note 1, at 181. 
104. VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), May 24, 1797, at 3. 
105. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 489, 490 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2002); see also, e.g., A Virginian, From the 
Virginia Argus, AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), June 21, 1797, at 3 (“I do not remember that 
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Many scholars have mistakenly characterized the episode as “an 
abortive attempt to try Congressman Samuel J. Cabell of Virginia for 
seditious libel.”106 The grand jury, however, had issued a “grievance 
presentment”—a type of censure, common in the South, that did not initiate 
criminal proceedings.107 The following year, for instance, a grand jury in 
Charleston “present[ed] as a grievance of the most dangerous nature to the 
community . . . that such a number of dogs are allowed to go about the streets, 
at present, when canine madness is so very prevalent in the city.”108 The 
Cabell presentment, too, pointed to “a real evil,” not a crime.109 
 
my astonishment has been so greatly excited as it was the other day at reading a presentment, by the 
grand jury to the federal court.”). Jefferson’s use of “it’s” as a possessive pronoun—common at that 
time—is edited here for clarity. 
106. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION, supra note 49, at 241; accord BLUMBERG, supra note 
8, at 74 (“The grand jury without dissent promptly returned a presentment charging Cabell with 
criminal libel . . . .” (footnote omitted)); JOSHUA A. CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: 
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 88 (2007) (“Samuel J. Cabell . . . was charged with seditious libel”); DAVID N. 
MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 199 (1994) (“[A] federal grand 
jury had returned a presentment, or formal accusation of crime, against Samuel J. Cabell . . . for 
seditious libel . . . .”); NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL 77 (1986) (“[G]rand jurors returned an indictment . . . against 
Congressman Samuel J. Cabell of Virginia for criminal libel.”); JAMES MORTON SMITH, 
FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 95 
(1956) (“[T]he federal grand jury at Richmond, Virginia, handed down a presentment which 
denounced the Republican representative from Albemarle district . . . .”). Several scholars have 
properly regarded the presentment as distinct from a formal charge. E.g., Koch & Ammon, supra 
note 6, at 152–53. The most thorough summary of the Cabell affair appears in Brent Tarter & Wythe 
Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand Juries in Virginia, 1789-1809, 49 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 257, 266–74 (2007). 
107. See Sally E. Hadden, South Carolina’s Grand Jury Presentments: The Eighteenth-Century 
Experience (explaining the difference between indictments and presentments), in SIGNPOSTS: NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY 89, 89 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds., 
2013); Renée B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1338 
(1994) (same). Some grievance presentments protested the Sedition Act. See Douglas Bradburn, A 
Clamor in the Public Mind: Opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, 65 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 
582 (2008) (discussing a Tennessee presentment). 
108. CITY GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER (Charleston, S.C.), Jan. 27, 1798, at 2. Grievance 
presentments were commonplace. See, e.g., Presentment of the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for 
the District of Virginia (May 23, 1794) (expressing a “national Grievanc[e]” over debts owed to 
Britain), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789-1800, at 472, 472 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988). 
109. Contemporaries widely understood the Cabell presentment as grievance presentment 
rather than as a formal indictment. See, e.g., Samuel Jordan Cabell, Letter, AURORA GEN. 
ADVERTISER (Phila.), May 31, 1797 (“They do not complain of violations of any law . . . but they 
complain of opinions . . . .”), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 183, 183–84; Anonymous Correspondent, 
Letter, PHILA. GAZETTE, June 16, 1797 (“When judges and juries, whose province is rigid justice 
under the law, quit that solid ground for the wide field of opinion, they may thereby become political 
engines . . . .”), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 199, 200; Letter from Henry Tazewell to [John Page?] 
(June 3, 1797) (“If the writers had violated the Laws, the Court and Jury knew that the Culprits and 
not their opinions were the fit subjects for animadversion.”), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
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Still, Republicans were livid. Federal judges, Cabell complained, had 
“become a band of political preachers, instead of a sage body to administer 
the law.”110 In a public letter addressed to Iredell, an anonymous author—
perhaps a young Henry Clay—alleged that “by not directing the attorney for 
the United States to prosecute, you tacitly admitted that the presentment was 
improper.”111 He excoriated Iredell for “endeavour[ing] to regulate the degree 
of heat” of political discussions. “You offer yourself as a political 
thermometer for the use of the Virginians! But I fear, sir, that the mercury of 
your political composition, will never rise to the temperature of 
manliness.”112 
Republican responses to the Cabell presentment flowed from their 
earlier defense of Democratic-Republican societies in the wake of the so-
called Whiskey Rebellion. Federalists, horrified by the blatant disregard for 
federal law in the West, had pinned the blame on “certain self-created 
societies,” commonly known now as Democratic-Republican societies.113 
Federalists in Congress sought a resolution condemning the societies for 
calumnies that, in their view, had excited the insurrection.114 In response, 
congressional Republicans “exploded in wrath.”115 “The law is the only rule 
 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 189, 189. The claim 
that “the grand jury quickly withdrew its presentment,” Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, 
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1142 (1973), is 
mistaken. 
110. Cabell, supra note 109, at 183. 
111. Scaevola, To James Iredell, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 11, 
1797, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 192, 194. Clay, who lived in Richmond until November 1797, 
used the pseudonym Scaevola the following year in Kentucky. 1 CALVIN COLTON, THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF HENRY CLAY 29, 187 (N.Y.C., A.S. Barnes & Co. 1846). Clay was involved in opposition 
to the Sedition Act in Kentucky. Bradburn, supra note 107, at 567–68. 
112. Scaevola, supra note 111, at 192. Iredell responded in a Richmond newspaper, explaining 
that “it has been a frequent practice in some of the southern states for grand juries to present what 
they considered as grievances though they could not be the foundation of a criminal prosecution.” 
James Iredell Letter, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 21, 1797, reprinted in 
3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, 
supra note 1, at 201, 202. 
113. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the United States Senate and House of 
Representatives (Nov. 19, 1794) (“In the four western Counties of Pennsylvania a prejudice . . . 
produced symptoms of riot and violence. . . . [C]ertain self-created societies assumed the tone of 
condemnation.”), in 17 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 181, 181 
(David R. Hoth & Carol S. Ebel eds., 2013); Letter from the United States Senate to George 
Washington (Nov. 22, 1794) (“Our anxiety, arising from the licentious & open resistance to the 
laws, in the western counties of Pennsylvania, has been increased, by the proceedings of certain 
self-created societies . . . .”), in 17 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, 
supra, at 198, 198. 
114. Philip S. Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies: An Introduction, in THE 
DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN SOCIETIES, 1790-1800: A DOCUMENTARY SOURCEBOOK OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, DECLARATIONS, ADDRESSES, RESOLUTIONS, AND TOASTS 3, 31 (Philip S. Foner 
ed., 1976). 
115. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD  
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of right,” James Madison insisted, and “what is consistent with that, is not 
punishable; what is not contrary to that, is innocent, or at least not censurable 
by the Legislative body.”116 With rhetorical flair, Madison explained: “If we 
advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the 
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the 
Government over the people.”117 
The Cabell affair brought back to the fore Republicans’ concerns over 
the lawless nature of public censures. “If these letters contained calumnies 
that were illegal—If they produced, or increased a foreign influence in our 
country contrary to law,” Cabell himself posited, “the authors were fit 
subjects for a presentment and for punishment.”118 But, he explained, only 
false statements of fact—not opinion—could support criminal charges.119 
Virginia Senator Henry Tazewell agreed. “Having presented the Letters and 
not the writers,” he explained, “they shew that the writers were no further 
censureable than for their political opinions. Thus have a Court and Jury 
erected themselves into a tribunal of political Censors.”120 Although 
Republicans frequently invoked speech and press freedoms,121 their 
arguments were directed at the lawless nature of the presentment rather than 
a lack of federal power over speech.122 Recall that “the very essence of civil 
 
1789–1801, at 190 (1997). The vehemence of Republican opposition perhaps stemmed from a fear 
that Congress might later invoke legislative privileges to punish critics of the government. 
116. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 935 (1794) (statement of Rep. James Madison). 
117. Id. at 934; see also id. at 917–18 (statement of Rep. William Giles) (making similar 
points). 
118. Cabell, supra note 109, at 183. 
119. Id. at 184 (“If I have written falsely with a view to deceive my countrymen, why did not 
this enlightened jury state the facts which I have misrepresented?”). 
120. Letter from Henry Tazewell to [John Page?], supra note 109, at 189; see also Marius, To 
Jugurtha, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 24, 1797 (“I doubt . . . whether a 
judicial body of men have a right to brand with infamy, the expression of . . . political 
sentiments . . . . If they do not punish them because they are without their jurisdiction, neither can 
they take cognizance of political opinions, which the law has not expressly placed within it.”), 
reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
1789-1800, supra note 1, at 203, 203–04; Scaevola, supra note 111, at 194 (“If the conduct for 
which mr. Cabell was presented was criminal, the court should have directed a prosecution . . . .”). 
121. E.g., Circular Letter from Anthony New (June 17, 1797), in 1 CIRCULAR LETTERS OF 
CONGRESSMEN TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS 1789–1829, supra note 97, at 91, 91; Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Peregrine Fitzhugh (June 4, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra 
note 105, at 415, 417. Perhaps even more commonly, Republicans invoked freedom of opinion. 
E.g., Marius, supra note 120, at 205; Circular Letter from John Clopton (June 19, 1797), in 1 
CIRCULAR LETTERS OF CONGRESSMEN TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS 1789–1829, supra note 97, at 94, 
94. Federalists sometimes rejected an absolute privilege to express opinions, making clear the 
natural-rights basis of the idea. See A Virginian, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL (Bos.), June 24, 1797 
(“Freedom of opinion is certainly an inherent privilege.—So is freedom of action.—But murder is 
to be punished by death. And although Grand Jurors are not lawmakers, yet they are its guardians, 
and it is their peculiar province to stop sedition . . . .”), reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 205, 205. 
122. Federalists responded that the grand jurors were merely presenting their opinion of 
Cabell’s letters, leaving Cabell and others free to express their views as well. E.g., A Friend to 
CAMPBELL.PRINTING (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/2019  11:28 PM 
2019] The Invention of First Amendment Federalism 545 
 
liberty” in the eighteenth century focused on the existence of prospective, 
generally applicable laws.123 
Alongside these old concerns about lawless political censorship, a new 
fear arose among Republicans from the Cabell affair: jury composition. 
“Look at the names,” Cabell wrote, pointing to the presence of several 
foreigners on the grand jury.124 Republicans worried about the jurors’ 
partisanship as well. According to the scurrilous Republican editor James 
Callender, who was later prosecuted under the Sedition Act, Cabell 
apparently claimed that “four fifths of the whole band consisted of pardoned 
tories, and of republicans imported from Scotland.”125 Tazewell also 
highlighted the jury’s membership, remarking that several jurors he was “not 
astonished at,” meaning they were known Federalist partisans.126 
Indeed, the members of the grand jury were a powerful and well-
connected group.127 The foreman, John Blair, was a former Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court. Joining him were a Federalist member of the 
Virginia House of Delegates,128 four former delegates,129 six merchants,130 
and several county clerks.131 Familial relationships abounded, too. One of the 
 
Juries, Letter to Samuel Jordan Cabell, VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), June 30, 
1797, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 207, 208–09; Timothy Tickle, Letter to Samuel Jordan Cabell, 
VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), July 5, 1797, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 213, 215–
16. 
123. HAMILTON, supra note 60, at 100. 
124. Cabell, supra note 109, at 184. 
125. 1 JAMES T. CALLENDER, THE PROSPECT BEFORE US 20 (Richmond, M. Jones, S. 
Pleasants, Jr. & J. Lyon 1800). 
126. Letter from Henry Tazewell to [John Page?], supra note 109, at 189. 
127. See Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (May 25, 1797) (describing the Grand Jury 
as “composed of many of the most respectable Men in the State”), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 182, 182. 
128. Robert Pollard was a Federalist member of the House of Delegates from King William 
County, where he also was clerk of court for many years. 
129. Former delegates were Corbin Griffin, Edward Hack Moseley, Thomas Newton, and 
Thomas Tinsley. 
130. Merchants included Robert Burton and Andrew Donald, who were members of expansive 
Scottish mercantile networks centered around Glasgow; Thomas Thompson, who was a native of 
Ireland and worked as a wine merchant in Madiera; Richard Randolph; William Vannerson; and 
Thomas Newton of Norfolk. 
131. Former clerks included Otway Byrd, Edward Hack Moseley, and Thomas Griffin Peachy. 
Joseph Selden, one of the few Republicans on the grand jury, was a judge in Richmond and later 
represented Henrico County in the House of Delegates. In 1802, Selden heard a libel complaint 
against publisher James Thompson Callender. Unlike the other three Republican magistrates, 
Selden ruled in favor of Callender, deciding “it improper that such a restraint should be laid on the 
press.” ALBANY GAZETTE, Jan. 17, 1803. This story apparently was reprinted from the Virginia 
Gazette. 
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grand jurors was the brother of the federal marshal,132 while another was the 
brother of Cyrus Griffin—one of the presiding judges.133 
The prominence of these men was no fluke. Virginia, although the 
country’s most populous state, had a small and interconnected group of 
affluent men who held most positions of public trust.134 And the federal 
marshal hand selected grand jurors from among this venerable group.135 
In the late 1780s, political elites had viewed the hand selection of jurors 
as a way of safeguarding rights. As one of the architects of the Judiciary Act, 
Oliver Ellsworth, put it, “a very ignorant Jury might be drawn by Ballot,” and 
parochial jurors might be inclined against defending property rights.136 Hand 
selection ensured that jurors would be men of sound judgment. “Care may be 
taken in the manner of forming the delegated body,” James Wilson explained 
in his law lectures.137 Although Federalists uniformly endorsed the need for 
representative institutions, they did not think that representative bodies had 
to reflect a cross-section of the society.138 Rather, a “very guarded selection” 
of jurors, Wilson observed, could be accomplished “by an officer, 
 
132. Richard Randolph was the brother of David Meade Randolph. 
133. Corbin Griffin was the brother of Cyrus Griffin. Other jurors were related to each other. 
Andrew Donald was the brother-in-law of fellow juror Callohill Mennis. Richard Randolph was 
married to Maria Beverley—a first cousin of Otway Byrd’s wife and a niece of Thomas Griffin 
Peachy’s wife. Peachy was first cousin of Corbin Griffin, his son had married John Blair’s niece, 
and he was related to Otway Byrd and Robert Pollard through his wife’s family. 
134. See, e.g., ALBERT H. TILLSON, JR., GENTRY AND COMMON FOLK: POLITICAL CULTURE 
ON A VIRGINIA FRONTIER 1740–1789, at 18 (1991) (“A small circle of elite families dominated 
most Virginia counties in the eighteenth century . . . .”). 
135. The Judiciary Act instructed federal marshals to summon jurors “designated by lot or 
otherwise in each State respectively according to the mode of forming juries therein now practised, 
so far as the laws of the same shall render such designation practicable by the courts or marshals of 
the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88. The Act further provided that 
federal jurors in each state had to have the same qualifications as required for jury service “in the 
highest courts of law of such State.” Id. In six of the original eleven states—Delaware, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, plus Kentucky and Vermont—this meant that 
federal marshals hand selected jurors. Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury 
and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1054 (2007); Juror 
Reform Bills of 1800, supra note 6, at 271. 
136. Letter from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 9–10, 1789) (reporting 
Ellsworth’s remarks), in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 6, at 496, 499; see also id. (“[State] Juries were too apt to be biassed 
ag[ain]st [foreigners], in favor of their own citizens & acquaintances . . . .”). Whigs had a 
longstanding complaint against the return of “Corrupt and Unqualifyed Persons” to serve on juries, 
including men who “were not Freeholders.” An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the 
Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, § 9 (Eng.) [hereinafter 
English Bill of Rights]. 
137. WILSON, supra note 32, at 961. Robert Jones provocatively describes the federal selection 
of jurors as the primary impetus for federal diversity jurisdiction. See Jones, supra note 135, at 1005 
(“[F]ederal officials could judiciously exercise their control over federal jury compositions to ensure 
that only the ‘better sort’ of Americans would decide cases in the federal courts.”). 
138.  See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 495–
99 (1969). 
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confidential, impartial, and, by the people themselves, appointed for this very 
purpose” without undercutting the jury’s representative role.139 
Partisanship was not yet a concern in the late 1780s. To be sure, some 
people expected that federal judges would be loyal supporters of the 
Washington administration,140 and countless Anti-Federalists worried about 
the ability of the federal government to change the venue of trials as a way of 
undercutting the jury right.141 Alexander Hamilton even acknowledged in 
Federalist No. 83 that the hand selection of jurors made judicial proceedings 
“more accessible to the touch of corruption.”142 But the Founders—in 
perhaps their greatest oversight—did not appreciate that the affinities of the 
people would soon fragment along partisan lines. 
By the late 1790s, however, jury selection by a presidential appointee 
presented obvious partiality concerns. Virginia’s federal marshal, David 
Meade Randolph, was an ardent Federalist who exhibited notable patterns in 
his juror picks. A recent study of federal grand juries in Richmond from 1789 
to 1809 found that “[e]very grand jury included several men who were or 
recently had been members of Virginia’s General Assembly or of Congress, 
and more than a few served prominently in one or the other legislative body 
or as governor after they were on the grand jury.”143 And their political views, 
unsurprisingly, tended to mirror those of the Administration.144 On the 
Richmond jury in 1797, for instance, eight of the seventeen jurors are known 
to have been Federalists,145 and five of the remaining nine were merchants,146 
a group that typically supported the Adams Administration. And Republicans 
knew it. No wonder they were so worried. 
 
 
139. WILSON, supra note 32, at 961. 
140. See PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER, Dec. 14, 1787 (expressing fears of a “partial and 
interested FEDERAL COURT”), reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 459, 459. 
141. Some Anti-Federalists emphasized the importance of a local jury to fact-finding given the 
familiarity of local juries with the characters of the witnesses and parties. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, 
THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 27–28 (1994). But, as Abramson 
trenchantly observes, “The jury served freedom not only by getting the facts right but also by getting 
the people right. Local citizens were empowered to control the actual administration of justice.” Id. 
at 28. 
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 19, at 564 (Alexander Hamilton). 
143. Tarter & Holt, supra note 106, at 263. 
144. Id. at 283. Federalists in Virginia usually were not partisan firebrands, at least compared 
to their northern counterparts, but they responded to Federalist calls for order. RICHARD R. BEEMAN, 
THE OLD DOMINION AND THE NEW NATION, 1788-1801, at 156–58 (1972). 
145. Those eight were John Blair, Otway Byrd, Corbin Griffin, Calohill Minnis, Thomas 
Griffin Peachy, Robert Pollard, Richard Randolph, and Thomas Tinsley. 
146. Those five were Robert Burton, Andrew Donald, Thomas Newton, Thomas Thompson, 
and William Vannerson. Richard Randolph was a merchant but was also a known Federalist. 
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B. The Jeffersonian Response 
Editorials about the Cabell presentment continued to appear in Virginia 
newspapers through late July,147 but the most interesting response came from 
Thomas Jefferson, who was then serving as Vice President. By early August, 
Jefferson had completed a draft petition that he planned to submit 
anonymously to the Virginia General Assembly through one of his friends.148 
The draft reveals two significant developments in Jefferson’s thinking. 
First, the draft portrayed the federal grand jury as an arm of the 
government, not as a representative body of the people. “[T]he Grand jury is 
a part of the Judiciary,” Jefferson wrote, and an effort by the judiciary to 
“interpose” on the “free correspondence” between representatives and their 
constituents was “to put the legislative department under the feet of the 
Judiciary.”149 This subordination was “more vitally dangerous,” he 
explained, “when it is considered that Grand jurors are selected by officers 
appointed and holding their places at the will of the Executive, that they are 
exposed to influence from the judges who are appointed immediately by the 
Executive.”150 
Second, Jefferson’s draft focused on the presentment’s utter 
lawlessness—not simply its error—thus opening the door to drastic 
countermeasures. Grand juries, he argued, were constrained by “known 
limits . . . to make presentment of those acts of individuals which the laws 
have declared to be crimes or misdemeanors.”151 The grand jurors’ 
“depart[ure] out of the legal limits of their said office,” he concluded, meant 
that they had “avail[ed] themselves of the sanction of its cover.”152 For well 
over one hundred years, jurors in England and the colonies had been immune 
from civil or criminal penalties.153 But by acting beyond their authority, 
Jefferson asserted, the federal grand jurors made themselves subject to 
punishment by the state assembly, even for offenses that “escape the 
definitions of the law.”154 
 
147. See, for instance, several letters in the Virginia Gazette, and General Advertiser 
(Richmond), July 26, 1797. 
148. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 105, at 490. 
149.  Thomas Jefferson, Draft Petition to the Virginia House of Delegates (Aug. 3, 1797), in 29 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 493, 495. 
150. Id. at 496. 
151. Id. at 495. 
152. Id. The apostrophe in the possessive pronoun “it’s” has been removed for clarity. 
153. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 426–27 (2009) 
(identifying Bushell’s Case, a 1670 English decision, as establishing juror immunity). 
154. Jefferson, supra note 149, at 496. Formally, Jefferson proposed that the General Assembly 
punish the grand jurors through impeachment. John Page also mentioned impeachment shortly after 
learning of Cabell’s presentment. See Letter from John Page to St. George Tucker (June 14, 1797) 
(“What think you of the late Presentment? I confess I feel almost disposed to impeach the Judge & 
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Jefferson sent his proposal to James Madison and James Monroe, who 
each returned with tepid replies.155 Monroe wondered “whether it would not 
be better to address it to the Congress?”156 In response, Jefferson admitted 
that doubts “as to [Virginia’s] jurisdiction” had occurred to him, too, but that 
sending a petition to the House of Representatives “would make bad worse, 
that a majority of that house would pass a vote of approbation.”157 Jefferson 
was in a bind. His argument focused on federal wrongs, but he knew that 
petitioning Congress would be counterproductive. 
An intellectual breakthrough came in his second draft. Jefferson began 
with the same argument, explaining how the grand jury had exceeded its 
authority. This time, however, he added that “independently of these 
considerations of a constitutional nature, the right of free correspondence 
between citizen and citizen on their joint interests, public or private, and 
under whatsoever laws these interests arise, is a natural right of every 
individual citizen, not the gift of municipal law.”158 All Founders would have 
agreed that retained natural rights preexisted constitutional formation, but 
Jefferson used this idea in a novel way. The right to the freedom of 
communication, he contended, was simply not a federal concern, and state 
control over the retained liberty of speech called for state remedies when that 
freedom was abridged. “[T]he right of free correspondence is not claimed 
under that [federal] constitution nor the laws or treaties derived from it,” he 
wrote, “but as a natural right, placed originally under the protection of our 
municipal laws, and retained under the cognizance of our own courts.”159 
Here we see the origins of a new understanding of the First Amendment. 
In his draft petition, Jefferson did not explain why the protection of natural 
rights was a uniquely state-based concern. But by contending that “the right 
of free correspondence is not claimed under that [federal] constitution,” 
Jefferson cast the First Amendment as not guaranteeing speech and press 
rights as federal rights. Apparently the Speech Clause gave the federal 
government no role to play in defending the freedom of speech, even against 
federal encroachment. Jefferson was not yet explicitly denying federal 
 
his Grd Jury!!!”), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1789-1800, supra note 1, at 190, 190 n.2. 
155. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 5, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 505, 505; Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson 
(Sept. 5, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 524, 524. 
156. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 155, at 524. 
157. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Sept. 7, 1797), in 29 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 526, 526. 
158. Thomas Jefferson, Revised Petition to the House of Delegates (Aug. 7–Sept. 7, 1797), in 
29 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 105, at 499, 502. 
159. Id.; accord Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, supra note 157, at 526 
(“[T]his right of free correspondence . . . has not been given to us under 1st. the federal constitution, 
2dly. any law of Congress, or 3dly. any treaty, but as before observed, by nature. It is therefore not 
alienated, but remains under the protection of [states’] courts.”). 
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authority to control speech, but his argument pointed clearly in that direction. 
The evolution of Jefferson’s drafts indicates that he developed new ideas 
in response to the particular challenge posed by the Cabell affair. Jefferson 
faced a practical problem—an intractable Congress—and he shaped a 
fascinating and innovative theory to meet that challenge. His desired remedy 
drove the analysis. 
As all creative thinkers do, Jefferson tapped into earlier strands of his 
constitutional thought. During the controversy over religious assessments in 
Virginia, for instance, he began with a widely accepted view that “the 
opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its 
jurisdiction,”160 signifying that the government could not punish people 
because of their thoughts. More controversially, Jefferson then argued that 
the freedom of religious conscience barred public interference with religious 
matters at all, even in the form of governmental support for religion through 
taxation.161 As noted earlier, this idea was highly creative, and probably not 
widely accepted.162 For present purposes, however, the key point is that 
Jefferson’s claim was about state-level support for religion; it had nothing to 
do with a unique definition of federal rights. 
During the ratification debates, Jefferson again made statements that 
could be read as denials of governmental power over certain natural rights. 
“There are rights which it is useless to surrender to the government, and 
which yet, governments have always been fond to invade,” he wrote to a 
correspondent in 1789.163 “These are,” he continued, “the rights of thinking, 
and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing: the right of free 
commerce: the right of personal freedom.”164 Understood contextually, 
however, Jefferson was not insisting that all governments lacked authority to 
limit expression, commerce, or freedom. Natural rights, in Jefferson’s view, 
were limited not only by a principle against harming others but also by certain 
social duties.165 The freedom of expression, for instance, easily comported 
 
160. Jefferson, supra note 86, at 546. Critics of Jefferson’s position accepted this premise. See 
An Eastern Layman, To The Publick, VA. GAZETTE (Williamsburg), Aug. 14, 1779, at 1 (“That the 
opinions of men are not the objects of civil government, is a dogma, to which every rational mind 
must necessarily accede . . . .”); see also, e.g., 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794) (statement of Rep. 
James Madison) (“Opinions are not the objects of legislation.”); A Landholder [Oliver Ellsworth], 
Letter VII to the Landholders and Farmers, CONN. COURANT (Hartford), Dec. 17, 1787 (“Civil 
government has no business to meddle with the private opinions of the people.”), reprinted in 14 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 448, 
451. 
161. See Jefferson, supra note 86, at 546 (“[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . . . .”). 
162. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text. 
163. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Humphreys (Mar. 18, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 74, at 676, 678. 
164. Id. 
165. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), 
in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 258, 258 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2009) (“I shall see with 
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with “liability of the printers for false facts printed.”166 In any event, 
Jefferson’s discussions of federal rights in the late 1780s again offer no 
indication that those rights would have different meanings at the federal and 
state levels. His innovative move toward such a theory in 1797 was genuinely 
novel, responding to a problem that simply had not existed a decade earlier. 
The House of Delegates debated Jefferson’s petition in late December 
1797.167 In the end, the delegates approved resolutions that chastised the 
grand jury for its “political criminality,” but they decided not to pursue 
impeachment. The resolutions concluded: 
That it ought therefore to be solemnly declared by the House of 
Delegates, that the said presentment is a violation of the fundamental 
principles of representation, incompatible with that independence 
between the co-ordinate branches of government, mediated both by 
the general and state constitutions: an usurpation of power not 
confided to one branch over another by any rule, legal or 
constitutional; and a subjection of the natural right of speaking and 
writing freely, to the censure and controul of Executive power.168 
The Virginia House of Delegates thus embraced Jefferson’s view of juries as 
arms of the government—a remarkable development attributable to 
Republican concerns about jury selection. No longer were juries, as Jefferson 
had heroically described in 1789, “the firmest bulwarks of English liberty.”169 
III. The Sedition Act 
Acrimonious partisanship escalated even further in 1798. In April, 
Jefferson informed Madison that “one of the war-party, in a fit of unguarded 
passion declared some time ago they would pass a citizen bill, an alien bill, 
& a sedition bill.”170 The object of a sedition bill, he presciently explained, 
would be “the suppression of the whig presses.”171 Sure enough, in late June 
federal officers arrested Benjamin Franklin Bache—the irascible editor of the 
 
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural 
rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.”). 
166. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 440, 442 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956). 
167. VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at 1. 
168. Id. at 2. 
169. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbé Arnoux, supra note 34, at 282, 283. Federalists 
protested Republican attacks on the jury, arguing that “legislative interferences with this sacred 
political institution tend to discredit the same, and by impairing its weight and influence, evidently 
promote the cause of despotism.” VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER (Richmond), Jan. 3, 1798, at 
2. But to no avail; the delegates overwhelmingly voted down Federalist proposals. Id. In a rarely 
mentioned epilogue, the Virginia Senate excoriated the House for passing resolutions on behalf of 
the people “without the participation of the Senate.” VA. GAZETTE, & GEN. ADVERTISER 
(Richmond), Jan. 10, 1798, at 2. 
170. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Apr. 26, 1798), in 30 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 299, 299 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003). 
171. Id. at 300. 
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most prominent Republican newspaper—on common law sedition charges, 
and less than a month later the Federalist majority in Congress passed a 
sedition law. 
A. Congressional Debates 
The Federalist argument for a Sedition Act was straightforward: 
Congress had an obligation to preserve the government. Seditious 
publications, Federalists insisted, were “approaches to revolution and 
Jacobinic domination.”172 Connecticut Representative John Allen put the 
point vividly: “[T]he liberty of vomiting . . . floods of falsehood and hatred” 
would produce effects already seen “across the water; it has there made slaves 
of thirty millions of men.”173 Indeed, the specter of revolutionary France 
loomed over the debates, not simply as a foreign threat but also as a 
forewarning of what might happen domestically if licentiousness reined free. 
As Kathryn Preyer cautions, “Only present-mindedness or lack of 
imagination leads us to dismiss casually such fears as paranoia.”174 
Relying on prevailing understandings of speech and press freedoms, 
Federalists had no trouble explaining the consistency of the Sedition Act with 
the First Amendment. “The terms ‘freedom of speech and of the press,’” 
Harrison Gray Otis explained, “were a phraseology perfectly familiar in the 
jurisprudence of every State, and of a certain and technical meaning . . . 
borrowed from the only country in which it had been tolerated.”175 That 
freedom, he continued, 
is nothing more than the liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking, 
one’s thoughts, under the condition of being answerable to the injured 
party, whether it be the Government or an individual, for false, 
malicious, and seditious expressions, whether spoken or written; and 
the liberty of the press is merely an exemption from all previous 
restraints.176 
 
172. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2098 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Allen). 
173. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 2146 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis) (“[E]very independent 
Government has a right to preserve and defend itself against injuries and outrages which endanger 
its existence . . . .”); id. at 2133 (statement of Rep. George Thatcher) (drawing an analogy to a 
federal law against threatening federal officials). Federalists described as “absurd” the view that the 
federal government might be “indebted to and dependent on an individual State for its protection.” 
Id. at 2146 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis). Notably, Federalists had already sketched out 
the basis for a possible sedition law in the 1794 congressional debates over Democratic-Republican 
societies. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 937 (1794) (statement of Rep. Samuel Dexter) (“[W]hen [speech 
and press] were so abused as to become hostile to liberty, and threaten her destruction, the abuses 
ought to be corrected . . . . [H]e did not doubt the right to forbid such flagrant outrages on social 
order, and all arts tending to produce them.”). 
174. Preyer, supra note 6, at 187. For a nuanced and penetrating review of Federalist thought, 
see generally Marc Lendler, “Equally Proper at All Times and at All Times Necessary”: Civility, 
Bad Tendency, and the Sedition Act, 24 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 419 (2004). 
175. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2147 (1798) (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis). 
176. Id. at 2148. 
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Otis’s comment reflects an important point that scholars often overlook: 
Many Federalists viewed the liberty of the press as simply a rule against prior 
restraints,177 but they described the freedom of speech in a more capacious 
manner, embracing a liberty of well-intentioned, noninjurious speaking, 
writing, and publishing.178 
Harmful speech, however, was an entirely different matter. “Because I 
have the liberty of locomotion, of going where I please,” John Allen asked, 
“have I a right to ride over the footman in the path?” Extending this idea, 
Allen explained: “The freedom of the press and opinions was never 
understood to give the right of publishing falsehoods and slanders, nor of 
exciting sedition, insurrection, and slaughter, with impunity.”179 Other 
Federalists echoed this theme.180 The sedition bill did not restrain “a free 
animadversion upon the proceedings of Congress, or the conduct of its 
members; it merely prohibits calumny and deception,” Harrison Gray Otis 
remarked.181 And “an honest jury” could distinguish the two by “decid[ing] 
upon the falsehood and malice of the intention.”182 Indeed, the Sedition Act 
explicitly recognized the availability of a truth defense and gave juries the 
power to render a general verdict.183 Thus, Otis insisted, the people “were 
 
177. See id. at 2102 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper) (defining the “true meaning” 
of “the liberty of the Press” as “no more than that a man shall be at liberty to print what he pleases, 
provided he does not offend against the laws”). 
178. The treatment of the Federalist understanding of the First Amendment as merely a rule 
against prior restraints is common in the literature. See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of 
Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2167, 2180 & n.51 (2015) (citing Otis for the principle that 
a “[no-prior-restraint] view of the freedom of speech and press had been propagated by some 
supporters of the Sedition Act of 1798”); Lendler, supra note 174, at 426 n.28 (“[I]t is clear that the 
Federalists thought the First Amendment meant ‘no prior restraint.’”). But Otis and other Federalists 
referred to that rule when expounding the liberty of the press, not the freedom of speech (or, as Otis 
put it, the “liberty of writing, publishing, and speaking”). 
179. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. at 2098 (1798) (remarks of Rep. John Allen); see also id. at 2112 
(remarks of Rep. Samuel Dana) (“Is [speech and press freedom] a license to injure others or the 
Government, by calumnies, with impunity? . . . Can it be anything more than the right of uttering 
and doing what is not injurious to others?”). 
180. E.g., id. at 2167 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper); id. at 2150 (statement of Rep. 
Harrison Gray Otis); id. at 2102 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper). 
181. Id. at 2150 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also, e.g., id. at 2156 (statement of 
Rep. Samuel Dana) (“[N]o honest man wanted the liberty of uttering malicious falsehood—and this 
law would operate against no other publications.”). 
182. Id. at 2149 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also id. at 2168 (statement of Rep. 
Robert Goodloe Harper) (echoing these comments about the role of juries in determining falsity and 
malice). 
183. The Senate bill did not mention a truth defense, but Federalists may have viewed the idea 
as implicit “from the construction of the bill itself.” Id. at 2134 (statement of Rep. Robert Goodloe 
Harper). Congressional debates reflect wide agreement that juries should be permitted to serve as 
“judges of the law as well as the fact,” id. at 2135; id. (statement of Rep. William Claiborne), 
meaning they would have “a power of returning a [general] verdict of guilty, or not guilty,” id. 
(statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also id. at 2136 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) 
(describing the common law principle that “a jury in criminal cases were judges not only of the fact, 
but also of the criminality of that fact”); id. (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Smith) (“[T]here can be 
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still at liberty, and would ever be so, to use their tongues and their pens, like 
all other property, so as to do no wanton and unjustifiable injury to others.”184 
Republicans lobbed a slew of arguments in reply.185 To justify 
“restraints on the liberty of speech and of the press,” Albert Gallatin 
explained, “it was at least necessary to prove the existence of a seditious 
disposition amongst the people.”186 Yet Federalists had failed, he insisted, in 
showing the “absolute necessity” that Republicans typically demanded of 
laws passed pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.187 Republicans 
further denied that Congress had authority to “provide for the punishment of 
any offences against Government” other than those specifically 
enumerated,188 unless a “specific power . . . could not be carried into effect” 
without the assistance of federal criminal law.189 
The First Amendment—then still known as the “third amendment”—
featured prominently in Republican arguments. According to John Nicholas, 
he had “looked in vain amongst the enumerated powers . . . for an authority 
to pass a law like the present; but he found what he considered as an express 
prohibition against passing it.”190 Nicholas did not deny that false statements 
had no value. “If there could be safety in adopting the principle, that no man 
should publish what is false,” he explained, “there certainly could be no 
 
no doubt but juries have already that power . . . .”). Among those who spoke up, only James Bayard 
opposed giving power to juries to decide law, arguing that “a power of this kind is much more safely 
lodged in the hands of learned and upright Judges, than it could possibly be in those of an unlettered 
and perhaps prejudiced jury.” Id. (statement of Rep. James Bayard). Bayard worried that “the effect 
of this amendment would be, to put it into the power of a jury to declare that this is an 
unconstitutional law, instead of leaving this to be determined, where it ought to be determined, by 
the Judiciary.” Id. 
184. Id. at 2151 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis); see also id. at 2168 (statement of Rep. 
Robert Goodloe Harper) (“[N]or could he be persuaded that the liberty of the press, as understood 
by the Constitution, could ever be abridged by a law to punish, on conviction before a jury, the 
publication of false, scandalous, and malicious libels.”). In the so-called “Minority Report,” 
Federalists in the Virginia Assembly, perhaps under the leadership of John Marshall, made similar 
arguments. Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 457–58 (2007). 
185. Scholars often criticize the bill for not protecting Vice President Thomas Jefferson and for 
its expiration at the end of the presidential term, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8, at 520; Mayton, supra 
note 8, at 124, but congressional debates do not reveal Republican opposition to either of these 
points, see, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2134, 2138 (1798) (reporting the votes on several amendments 
to the bill); see also Lendler, supra note 174, at 420 (noting attempts to reauthorize the Act in 1801). 
186. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2111 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). 
187. Id.; see also, e.g., id. at 2159, 2161–62 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (emphasizing 
the lack of necessity); id. at 2106 (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Macon) (arguing that the availability 
of state libel prosecutions showed a lack of necessity for federal law). 
188. Id. at 2158 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin); see also, e.g., id. at 2151–52 (statement of 
Rep. Nathaniel Macon) (“They (Congress) have power to define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations; but they have no power to 
define any other crime whatever.” (quoting James Iredell)). 
189. Id. at 2159 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). 
190. Id. at 2139 (statement of Rep. John Nicholas). 
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objection to it.”191 What worried Nicholas, though, was the administration of 
a sedition law. The “eye of a jealous Government,” he explained, would 
“torture” critical statements “into an offence against this law.”192 And critics 
would then “have to be tried by judges appointed by the President, and by 
juries selected by the Marshal, who also receives his appointment from the 
President, all whose feelings would, of course, be inclined to commit the 
offender if possible.”193 The solution, for Nicholas, was a full denial of 
federal authority. “On this account,” he insisted, “the General Government 
has been forbidden to touch the press.”194 
Edward Livingston made similar points. “Every man’s character is 
protected by law, and every man who shall publish a libel on any part of the 
Government, is liable to punishment,” Livingston explained.195 But only state 
authorities had that power. It was “much more probable,” he insisted, “that 
justice will be found in a court in which neither of the parties have influence, 
than in one which is wholly in the power of the President.”196 The problem, 
in Livingston’s view, was straightforward. Federal judges were presidential 
appointees, and the jury was “selected by an officer holding his office at the 
will of the President.”197 
Albert Gallatin concurred. “[A]lthough there might be no change made 
by this bill in the law of libels,” he acknowledged, “there was an all-important 
one made by the transfer of jurisdiction.”198 Again, the crux of the problem 
was jury selection. Federal marshals chose jurors in many states, Gallatin 
observed, and each marshal was a “creature of the Executive.”199 The sheriff 
charged with selecting jurors in Pennsylvania, by contrast, was elected to a 
three-year term, making him an “officer of the people.”200 This distinction 
between state and federal jury-selection practices might be “immaterial . . . 
in ordinary suits or prosecutions,” Gallatin admitted, but suits “of a political 
nature” were entirely different.201 In these cases, he explained, “the jury was 
liable to be packed by the Administration.”202 
Leading Republicans in the House thus presented a unified attack on the 
Sedition Act using a new theory of the First Amendment. The degree of 
 




195. Id. at 2153 (statement of Rep. Edward Livingston). 
196. Id. at 2154. 
197. Id. at 2153. 
198. Id. at 2163 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin); see also id. at 2159–60 (“The sense, in 
which he and his friends understood this amendment, was that Congress could not pass any law to 
punish any real or supposed abuse of the press.”). 
199. Id. at 2164. 
200. Id. at 2163–64. 
201. Id. at 2164. 
202. Id. 
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coordination between Nicholas, Livingston, and Gallatin is unclear, nor do 
we know how Jefferson may have influenced their strategy.203 But the 
harmony of their opposition is striking. All three men pointed to jury 
selection when explaining why the federal government could not pass a 
sedition law. Perhaps not coincidentally, these three Republicans—from 
Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania—each came from a state where 
federal marshals hand selected jurors and where most of the leading 
Republican newspapers operated. Indeed, as it turned out, the bulk of 
Sedition Act prosecutions were in states with hand selection of jurors.204 
The Republican emphasis on federal power and jury selection reinforced 
several of their recurring constitutional motifs. One was an emphasis on 
constitutional limitations of federal power—a theme in Republican politics 
throughout the 1790s. Another was a claim about unchecked executive 
discretion. The principal Republican arguments against the 1798 Alien 
Friends Act, for instance, were that Congress lacked authority to pass the bill 
and that it gave the President too much control. With its emphasis on partisan 
jury selection, Republican opposition to the Sedition Act played to both of 
these themes.205 
Provocatively, Republicans also invoked the longstanding principle that 
no man may judge his own case, turning the earlier anti-corruption 
justification for juries on its head. “If there could be safety in adopting the 
principle, that no man should publish what is false,” John Nicholas explained 
early on in the debates, “there certainly could be no objection to it,”206 
accepting that expressive freedom did not require a categorical denial of 
governmental power over speech. But, he cautioned, “the persons who would 
have to preside in trials of this sort, would themselves be parties, or at least 
they would be so far interested in the issue, that the trial of the truth or 
falsehood of a matter would not be safe in their hands.”207 And it was “[o]n 
 
203. Jefferson was extraordinarily cautious in his correspondence at this time, DUMAS 
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 319–20 (1962), and his presence in 
Philadelphia until the eve of the Sedition Act debates in the House leaves unclear how he may have 
personally shaped the Republican opposition at this time. Without success, I have reviewed the 
papers of Albert Gallatin at the Library of Congress, the papers of Edward Livingston at Princeton, 
and the papers of the Nicholas family at the University of Virginia. 
204. Federalists prosecuted the editors of seven newspapers in hand-selection states—two in 
Vermont, two in New York, two in Pennsylvania, and one in Virginia—and one each in the 
selection-by-lot states of Massachusetts and Connecticut. BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 102–34. 
Other confirmed prosecutions took place in Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont, again tilting 
toward the hand-selection states. Id. at 134–39. 
205. For Republican opposition to the Alien Friends Act, see generally, JOHN C. MILLER, 
CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1951). For continuity in Republican thought 
about federalism, see generally, K.R. Constantine Gutzman, The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions 
Reconsidered: “An Appeal to the Real Laws of Our Country”, 66 J.S. HIST. 473 (2000). 
206. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2140 (1798) (statement of Rep. John Nicholas). 
207. Id. 
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this account,” Nicholas concluded, that “the General Government has been 
forbidden to touch the press.”208 
Congressional Republicans occasionally hinted at a broader 
understanding of speech and press freedoms without relying on federalism.209 
But these arguments were subject to a devastating Federalist response: states 
had recognized the limited scope of speech and press freedoms by routinely 
restricting expression. One state law barred “aiding in a lottery by printing or 
publishing a scheme on account of it.”210 Another imposed “heavy 
penalt[ies]” on persons who “by public or private discourse or 
conversation . . . should dissuade or endeavor to prevent an officer from 
doing his duty in quelling riots.”211 Virginia had passed a law “against cursing 
and swearing, which,” as Harrison Gray Otis pointed out, “is merely using 
the liberty of speech.”212 Indeed, any number of crimes like forgery or bribery 
could be “effected through the medium of the press or of the pen” or be “done 
by words only.”213 In the face of these laws, the new theory offered 
Republicans a way to deny federal authority to pass the Sedition Act without 
condemning these sorts of uncontroversial state laws. 
B. Republican Opposition 
After the Sedition Act went into effect, Republicans maintained steady 
attention on the issue of jury selection. “This power in a marshal, is a more 
complete and severe check on the press, and the right of the people to remark 
on public affairs,” Charles Pinckney declared, “than ten thousand sedition 
laws, because here the power to select and by that means govern the opinion 
of juries, is continual, always increasing, and in a great degree subject on 
every trial to the wishes and directions of a President.”214 In states where “the 
federal marshals have a right to summon jurors as they please,” he implored, 
“the people are not free.”215 Rather, justice in those states 
 
208. Id. 
209. See, e.g., id. at 2160 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin) (describing reliance on the 
distinction between liberty and license as an “insulting evasion” of the Constitution). Gallatin 
further argued that speech was not subject to “previous restraints” unless “the Constitution had given 
Congress a power to seal the mouths or to cut the tongues of the citizens of the Union,” id., and 
therefore “a Constitutional clause forbidding any abridgement of the freedom of speech must 
necessarily mean, not that no laws should be passed laying previous restraints upon it, but that no 
punishment should by law be inflicted upon it,” id. at 2160–61. 
210. Id. at 2148 (statement of Rep. Harrison Gray Otis). 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 2149. 
213. Id. Federalists tried to reauthorize the Sedition Act in January 1801, leading to a reprisal 
of the same arguments. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 916–40, 946–58, 960–76 (1801). Republicans again 
highlighted jury selection as a principal concern. E.g., id. at 965 (statement of Rep. Nathaniel 
Macon); id. at 951 (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). 
214. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 40 (1800) (statement of Sen. Charles Pinckney). 
215. Id. at 37. 
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must depend not on the laws but the integrity and honest independence 
of a marshal; to him is left the monstrous and dangerous power of 
summoning proper or improper, fit or unfit, dishonest or upright 
men—men who may be the friends or enemies to the parties who are 
on their trial, or who on political questions may be known to be 
opposed to them, and to hold opinions diametrically contrary to those 
which are perhaps in the course of the trial to be submitted to them for 
their decision.216 
Fears of partisan jury selection and calls for reform were common themes in 
other Republican writings.217 
Thomas Jefferson, too, began to consider ways of reforming jury-
selection practices. “[T]he people themselves are the safest deposit of 
power . . . [and] are competent to the appointment or election of their agents,” 
Jefferson wrote in a petition drafted in October 1798.218 Appointment of 
jurors, however, “has not been left in their hands, but has been placed by law 
in officers, dependant on the Executive or Judiciary bodies.”219 In place of 
this system, Jefferson proposed that Virginians elect a list of federal jurors, 
with panels of grand and petit jurors chosen randomly from that list.220 This 
method would strip control from federal marshals without, in turn, 
empowering federal judges by creating juries “pliable to the will and designs 
of power.”221 
While Jefferson was contemplating jury selection, he was also preparing 
a draft resolution that he called “the Kentuckey resolves,”222 now commonly 
known as the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.223 The draft took an 
 
216. Id. 
217. See, e.g., Virginia Assembly Debates (Dec. 19, 1798) (statement of Del. William Daniel) 
(warning of “a jury summoned with a special regard to their political opinions”), in DEBATES IN 
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 35, at 99; AURORA GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), 
Nov. 7, 1799, at 3 (“How could such a President secure the conviction of those men? By influencing 
marshals to pack juries, to select men who should be devoted to his interest.”); AURORA GEN. 
ADVERTISER (Phila.), May 20, 1799, at 2 (“The Grand Jury [are] well selected and as well calculated 
to echo the sentiments of any Judge . . . .”); see also Juror Reform Bills of 1800, supra note 6, at 
270 (“Concern about juror selection increased during the Sedition Act trials that were held between 
1798 and 1800. Throughout those well-publicized proceedings, Republicans insisted that federal 
marshals were packing juries to secure the conviction of men who had criticized the Adams 
administration.” (footnote omitted)). 
218. Thomas Jefferson, Petition to the General Assembly of Virginia (Nov. 2 or 3, 1798), in 30 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 571, 572. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 573. 
221. Id. Jefferson was tapping into a Republican fear that judges would overbear unwitting 
jurors. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 115–30 (2004) (recounting an episode of heavy-handed judges in early 
nineteenth-century New Hampshire). 
222. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Nov. 17, 1798), in 17 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 20, at 175, 175. 
223. Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
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extraordinarily bold position against federal power. The Constitution, he 
explained, was a mere compact (“under the style & title of a Constitution”) 
creating a government “for special purposes” with “certain definite 
powers.”224 Those powers included authority to recognize only a few 
crimes—treason, counterfeiting, piracy, offenses against the law of nations—
and “no other crimes whatsoever.”225 Statutes creating any other crimes, he 
admonished, were “altogether void and of no force.”226 
Jefferson then turned to speech and press freedoms. Under its 
enumerated powers, and based on the Tenth Amendment, he explained, 
Congress had “no power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or 
freedom of the press.”227 Instead, states retained “all lawful powers” 
respecting those subjects, and each state retained “the right of judging how 
far the licentiousness of speech and of the press may be abridged without 
lessening their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be 
separated from their use should be tolerated rather than the use be 
destroyed.”228 In other words, the implicit reservation of speech and press 
freedoms under the Constitution meant not simply that the federal 
government could not abridge rights to speaking, writing, and publishing, but 
that it could not touch those subjects at all because doing so would require 
defining the scope of those rights. Recall that Jefferson had already begun to 
articulate this idea in response to the Cabell presentment. 
After offering this account, Jefferson noted that “another & more special 
provision”—the First Amendment—reinforced the same conclusion: that 
“libels, falsehood and defamation equally with heresy & false religion are 
witheld from the cognisance of federal tribunals.”229 The Kentucky 
Resolutions thus defended an understanding of the First Amendment that 
limited federal power without explaining how state protections for speech 
and press freedoms might constrain state governments.230 And, as with his 
 
JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 529. The main text quotes from Jefferson’s draft, but his “fair copy” 
is virtually identical. See Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Fair Copy (before Oct. 4, 1798), in 30 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 543, 543–45. On the origins of the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions, see generally Koch & Ammon, supra note 6. 
224. Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson’s Draft (before Oct. 4, 1798), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, supra note 170, at 536, 536. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 536–37. 
228. Id. at 537. 
229. Id. 
230. Jefferson, however, clearly indicated that states could “abridge[ ]” the “licentiousness of 
speech and of the press.” Id. Indeed, although Kentucky’s 1799 Constitution provided that “every 
citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject,” it recognized legal responsibility “for the 
abuse of that liberty.” KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 7. It further provided for a truth defense in 
“prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a 
public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information.” Id., art. X, § 8. 
These provisions were modeled on PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 7. 
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response to the Cabell presentment, Jefferson’s argument for exclusive state 
authority over speech and the press also helped justify his radical state-based 
remedy: a declaration by the Kentucky legislature that the Sedition Act “is 
not law but is altogether void and of no force.”231 
In the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, by contrast, James Madison 
provided a more nuanced account of the First Amendment. The Sedition Act, 
Madison explained, exercised 
a power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary 
expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto; 
a power which more than any other ought to produce universal alarm, 
because it is levelled against that right of freely examining public 
characters and measures, and of free communication among the 
people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed, the only effectual 
guardian of every other right.232 
The Sedition Act, he concluded, was a “palpable violation” of the rights that 
the people had “declared and secured.”233 Although not entirely clear, 
Madison seems to have been suggesting that an equivalent state sedition law 
would also abridge the right of “free communication among the people.”234 
Just a few weeks later, however, the Virginia legislature issued an 
“Address” that squarely returned to the Jeffersonian position.235 “Every 
libellous writing or expression,” the Assembly explained, “might receive its 
punishment in the State courts, from juries summoned by an officer, who 
does not receive his appointment from the President, and is under no 
influence to court the pleasure of Government, whether it injured public 
officers or private citizens.”236 Yet again, Republicans explicitly adopted a 
theory of speech and press freedoms grounded on a fear of corruptly chosen 
federal juries. 
 
231. Jefferson, supra note 224, at 537. In the Virginia legislature, John Taylor of Caroline 
similarly tied the state-based remedy to the usurpation of state power. See Virginia Assembly 
Debates (Dec. 20, 1798) (statement of Del. John Taylor of Caroline) (“[T]he States . . . as parties 
[to the Constitution], were justifiable in preserving their rights under the compact against 
violation.”), in DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 35, at 132–33. 
232. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 20, at 185, 189–90. 
233. Id. at 190. 
234. Id. 
235. The Address is often errantly attributed to James Madison. See David B. Mattern et al., 
Note on the Virginia Resolutions, 10 January 1799, and the Address of the General Assembly to the 
People of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 23 January 1799 (addressing this misconception), in 17 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 20, at 199, 199–206. The Address criticizes Federalist 
reliance on the First Amendment as a source of federal power, but it does not articulate a theory of 
speech and press freedoms that would inhibit sedition prosecutions. 
236. Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Jan. 23, 
1799), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS 
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE 
FIRST TIME PRINTED 332, 334 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
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IV. The Invention of First Amendment Federalism 
A. Recasting History 
Skepticism about the administration of laws abridging speech, rather 
than opposition to the laws themselves, drove Republican thought. “If the 
triers were formed of angelic materials . . . and blessed with a considerate 
impartiality, that never was known to dwell in the hot flame of party spirit,” 
a Virginia editorial opined, “this law might not then in its effects be a 
destruction of any thing but the abuse and licentiousness of the press.”237 But 
a federal marshal “would, no doubt, select those whom he should think good 
jurors, and warm friends to his good order, when a question of good order 
was upon the carpet.”238 And juries therefore were “not so much a body of 
inquest as instruments of conviction.”239 Republicans echoed these ideas over 
and over throughout debates over the Sedition Act, portraying the Act as 
giving the President dangerous authority to control the outcomes of cases in 
which he and his party had an interest. 
As they recast the First Amendment, Republicans may have realized that 
the text of the First Amendment was largely unhelpful to their cause. Its 
language, Federalists pointed out, had an established common law meaning 
that was generally understood to permit sedition prosecutions.240 To counter 
this persuasive textual argument, Republicans shifted their focus to a broader 
historical narrative. Particularly noteworthy is the account in the Virginia 
Report of 1800, authored by James Madison. 
Madison’s historical reimagination began overseas. To understand the 
“American idea” of the freedom of the press, he explained, it was useful to 
start with “[t]he essential difference between the British government, and the 
American constitutions.”241 Under the British constitution, he wrote, “the 
danger of encroachments on the rights of the people, is understood to be 
confined to the executive magistrate,” and therefore “an exemption of the 
press from previous restraint by licensers appointed by the king, is all the 
freedom that can be secured to it.”242 (Madison was referring, at least in part, 
to the English Bill of Rights, which imposed disabilities on the King but not 
Parliament.243) But in the United States, Madison insisted, “the case is 
altogether different. The people, not the government, possess the absolute 
sovereignty.”244 Thus, he concluded:  
 
237. The Independent (Dec. 11, 1798), TIMES & ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 1798. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. See supra notes 175–84 and accompanying text. 
241. MADISON, supra note 20, at 336. 
242. Id. 
243. English Bill of Rights, supra note 136. 
244. MADISON, supra note 20, at 336–37. 
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This security of the freedom of the press, requires that it should be 
exempt, not only from previous restraint by the executive, as in Great 
Britain; but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be 
effectual, must be an exemption, not only from the previous inspection 
of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws.245 
In the English constitutional tradition, however, it was simply untrue 
that customary constitutional rights restricted only executive power. Rather, 
these rights routinely imposed limits on the rightful exercise of legislative 
authority. The rule against ex post facto laws is an obvious example. 
Parliamentary acts were generally unreviewable in court because of 
Parliament’s legal supremacy, but most elites had long since come to the 
view that sovereignty resided in the people themselves, and that Parliament 
was constrained by the customary constitution even though its acts were 
beyond judicial review.246 Following this tradition, the American colonists 
had fought a revolution to defend their rights as Englishmen—not to 
transform the meaning of those rights.247 
Consequently, there was nothing peculiar about using English traditions 
to define American liberties.248 Americans “hav[e] derived all [their] rights, 
from one common source, the British systems,” Federal Farmer 
characteristically explained.249 To be sure, not all of these rights were 
enumerated in England’s foundational constitutional texts. As Madison had 
explained in 1789, 
whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or 
 
245. Id. at 337. 
246. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 250–54 (2008); JOHN PHILLIP REID, 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 84–
86 (1991). On the development of popular sovereignty, see generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, 
INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988). 
247. For discussions of English rights and the American Revolution, see generally JACK P. 
GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011) and REID, supra 
note 32. 
248. Indeed, when arguing for the protection of customary rights, Anti-Federalists often relied 
on English authorities like Blackstone. E.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph 
(Oct. 16, 1787), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 64, at 61, 62–63. 
249. FEDERAL FARMER, LETTER II TO THE REPUBLIC (1787), reprinted in 19 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 214, 216; 
see also, e.g., A PLEBEIAN, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1788) 
(asserting that “it was useless to stipulate for the liberty of the press” in New York’s constitution, 
“for the common and statute law of England, and the laws of the colony are established, in which 
this privilege is fully defined and secured”), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 37, at 942, 961. Interestingly, some Federalists 
in the First Congress adopted the narrative of American exceptionalism when protesting a proposed 
law that would have disabled federal officers from electioneering, with other representatives relying 
on English precedents. Debates in the House of Representatives, Third Session (Jan. 21, 1791), in 
14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, at 339, 339–42 (William Charles diGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995). 
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liberty of conscience, come in question in [Parliament], the invasion 
of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not 
contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting 
which the people of America are most alarmed.250 
The First Amendment did not change the meaning of these rights by 
transforming them into restraints on legislative power; speech and press 
freedoms already imposed limits on legislative power. Rather, the American 
innovation was to enumerate these rights. The history of the ratification 
controversy offered no support to Madison’s declaration in the Virginia 
Report that “[t]he state of the press, therefore, under the common law, can 
not in this point of view, be the standard of its freedom, in the United 
States.”251 English press freedom did limit Parliamentary authority. 
Even if Americans were to depart from Blackstone’s definition of press 
freedom, however, Madison recognized that they would still need to 
determine “the proper boundary between the liberty and licentiousness of the 
press.”252 But this difficulty was beside the point regarding federal 
regulations of speech, Madison argued, because the First Amendment “was 
meant as a positive denial to Congress, of any power whatever on the 
subject.”253 Venturing beyond his Virginia Resolutions of 1798, Madison 
now clearly adopted the standard Republican position. “To demonstrate that 
this was the true object of the article,” he wrote, “it will be sufficient to recall 
the circumstances which led to it, and to refer to the explanation 
accompanying the article.”254 Again, Madison was turning to history. 
The absence of enumerated rights in the original Constitution, combined 
with congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Madison 
recalled, led to “great apprehensions” that “certain rights, and . . . the 
freedom of the press particularly,” might be “drawn by construction within 
some of the powers vested in Congress.”255 Federalists, he explained, had 
urged that “the power over the rights in question, and particularly over the 
press, was neither among the enumerated powers, nor incident to any of 
 
250. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison). Madison went on to 
say: “The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are 
unguarded in the British Constitution.” Id. Assuming that the debate records are accurate, Madison 
seems to have viewed “the British Constitution” as limited to constitutional documents like Magna 
Carta and the English Bill of Rights. But the key point to recognize is that Madison clearly 
appreciated in 1789 that English constitutionalism recognized certain “great rights”—like “freedom 
of the press”—that operated against legislative as well as executive action. Thus, even if those 
English rights were not explicitly solemnized in constitutional texts, their definition needed no 
transformation when taken from England and applied in the United States. 
251. MADISON, supra note 20, at 337. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 339. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
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them.”256 Thus, he concluded, “it would seem scarcely possible to doubt, that 
no power whatever over the press, was supposed to be delegated by the 
constitution, as it originally stood; and that the amendment was intended as 
a positive and absolute reservation of it.”257 In other words, the press was 
“wholly exempt from the power of Congress.”258 
Many scholars still defend the Republican view that the First 
Amendment disabled the federal government from passing laws that touch 
speech.259 This argument, in turn, bolsters the idea that free speech challenges 
should be “facial,” focusing on the constitutionality of laws rather than the 
facts of particular cases. Nicholas Rosenkranz, for instance, notes that 
Thomas Jefferson’s analysis of the Sedition Act’s constitutional deficiency 
“was ‘facial’ in the sense that he found the constitutional violation to be 
evident on the face of the statute.”260 Along similar lines, relying extensively 
on Jefferson’s and Madison’s arguments against the Sedition Act, Kurt Lash 
argues for a similar assessment of religious freedom because “the original 
Free Exercise Clause . . . appears to be limited to a prohibition of laws that 
abridge religion qua religion.”261 Meanwhile, Will Baude uses the 
Republican opposition to suggest that “regulation of the press is a great 
power” that cannot be reached under the Necessary and Proper Clause.262 
Republicans, however, were making novel arguments against the 
Sedition Act, offering a distorted view of the First Amendment’s origins. To 
be sure, a few Federalists had argued that the federal government would lack 
 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 340. Madison also used the rule against prior restraints to argue against legislative 
interference with the press. In order to be effectual, he insisted, the “exemption” of the press from 
“legislative restraint . . . must be an exemption, not only from the previous inspection of licensers, 
but from the subsequent penalty of laws,” id. at 337, because “a law inflicting penalties on printed 
publications, would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them,” id. at 
336. 
258. Id. at 340. A year earlier, prominent Virginia lawyer George Hay had offered a similar 
account of the First Amendment’s origins. See HORTENSIUS [GEORGE HAY], AN ESSAY ON THE 
LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 37–38 (Phila., Aurora Office 1799) (“If the word freedom was used in [a 
natural-rights] sense, by the framers of the amendment, they meant to say, Congress shall make no 
law abridging the freedom of the press, which freedom, however, is to be regulated by law. Folly 
itself does not speak such language.”). 
259. E.g., Lash, supra note 87, at 1111–14; Mayton, supra note 8, at 97, 119. 
260. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 
1236, 1271 (2010). 
261. Lash, supra note 87, at 1113; see also Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Two Concepts of Religious 
Liberty: The Natural Rights and Moral Autonomy Approaches to the Free Exercise of Religion, 110 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369, 369 (2016) (“The founders’ jurisdictional understanding of religious 
liberty denies the idea of a constitutional right to religious exemptions.”). Lash later adopted the 
Jeffersonian position full stop, arguing that prior to 1868 Congress had no authority to grant 
religious exemptions even to its own laws. Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1069, 1099–1116 (1998). 
262. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 
1822 (2013). 
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any authority to regulate the press under Article I.263 Most Federalist denials 
of federal power to restrain the liberty of the press, however, were based on 
the implied retention of rights, not a categorical lack of federal power.264 And 
when Federalists had openly denied federal power over the liberty of the 
press, they often clarified that they were simply disclaiming federal power to 
initiate a licensing regime.265 
Most importantly, though, whatever their views on the extent of 
congressional powers, nobody in the ratification debates suggested that 
adding a guarantee of speech and press freedoms would reinforce an absence 
of federal power over expression. If anything, they recognized that such an 
enumeration would imply just the opposite. As Alexander Hamilton noted in 
Federalist No. 84, for instance, a “provision against restraining the liberty of 
the press” would “afford[] a clear implication that a power to prescribe proper 
regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national 
government.”266 
Like so much of constitutional debate in the 1790s, Madison made new 
arguments in light of new circumstances. The Framers had not anticipated 
the emergence of political parties, and the alignment of partisan interests 
among the three branches—combined with the hand selection of federal 
jurors in many states—created a toxic environment for political dissenters. 
And, recognizing this development explicitly, Republicans justified their 
interpretation of the First Amendment by invoking the axiom of natural law 
that no man should decide his own case. “[W]hat security of a fair trial 
remained to a citizen,” Albert Gallatin asked rhetorically, “when the jury was 
liable to be packed by the Administration, when the same men were to be 
judges and parties?”267 To the extent that Founding Era constitutionalism 
allowed appeals to social-contract theory and natural law to interpret 
constitutional provisions, Republicans had a plausible case that the 
emergence of political parties had transformed constitutional meaning.268 
 
263. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 300 n.242 (collecting sources). 
264. Id. at 301. 
265. Id. at 300. 
266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 19, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton); see also, e.g., THE 
ADDRESS OF THE MINORITY IN THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT STATE; 
CONTAINING A VINDICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 12 
(1799) (“It would have been certainly unnecessary thus to have modified the legislative powers of 
Congress concerning the press, if the power itself does not exist.”). Some have proposed that this 
line of reasoning violates the constructive rule in the Ninth Amendment. E.g., Baude, supra note 
262, at 1796–98. But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 659 n.3 (2012) 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (inferring power from the Fifth Amendment). 
Madison’s original draft of the Ninth Amendment included a rule specifically barring a powers-
enlarging inference from the enumeration of rights, but this language did not survive in the House. 
Leslie W. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 632 (1956). 
267. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2164 (1798) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). 
268. On the importance of social-contract theory and natural law in shaping constitutional 
discourse at the Founding, see generally Campbell, supra note 26. 
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Republicans, however, resolutely avoided casting their argument in 
terms of constitutional change. Rather, “the best way of coming at the truth 
of the construction of any part of the Constitution,” they insisted, was 
“examining the opinions that were held respecting it when it was under 
discussion in the different States.”269 The position of Madison and his 
colleagues, in other words, was constrained by a constitutional culture that 
prized historical argument over openly acknowledged shifts in constitutional 
meaning.270 History was, as it continues to be, a core feature of American 
constitutionalism. 
The fact that Republicans made new arguments in historical terms ought 
to give us significant pause about modern reliance on post-ratification 
statements as evidence of original meaning. Scholars of the Founding have 
widely appreciated the remarkable diversity and fluidity of constitutional 
argument,271 making it tricky to assess whether and how debates in the 1790s 
reflected original meaning. What the history of the Republican opposition to 
the Sedition Act adds to this challenge is recognition of a constitutional 
culture where novel arguments were actually cast in historical terms by the 
Founders themselves. None of this is to deny our capacity to produce 
intellectual histories of Founding Era constitutional thought. But that task 
certainly becomes harder after realizing that the Founders were originalists 
and living constitutionalists at the very same time. 
Drawing on their revised view of history, Republican opponents of the 
Sedition Act had a profound influence on American constitutionalism. 
Leading Virginia jurist Spencer Roane described Madison’s Report as “the 
Magna Charta on which the republicans settled down, after the great struggle 
in the year 1799.”272 For the next century, however, that legacy was defined 
by a narrow understanding of federal power, with profound ramifications that 
 
269. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151 (1798) (statement of Rep. Nathaniel Macon). 
270. See GIENAPP, supra note 17 (exploring this concept); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of 
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the “Living Constitution” in the Course of 
American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191, 192–93, 197–213 (1997) (same); see, e.g., 
Virginia Assembly Debates (Dec. 13, 1798) (statement of Del. John Taylor of Caroline) (“He then 
read the 3d article of the amendments to the constitution concerning freedom of speech &c. and 
asked in what sense this clause was understood at the time of adoption?”), in DEBATES IN THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, supra note 35, at 7. To be sure, it is possible that Madison 
fully believed what he was saying about history. But the 1798 Virginia Resolutions, which did not 
articulate a jurisdictional view of the First Amendment, see supra notes 232–34 and accompanying 
text, suggest that Madison was a latecomer to the dominant Republican position. For a discussion 
of “Madison and the Origins of Originalism,” focusing on Madison’s constitutional arguments 
earlier in the 1790s, see RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 339–65. Intriguingly, Madison’s later 
invocations of the ratification debates may be inconsistent with his earlier views about using that 
type of evidence in constitutional interpretation. Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original 
Understanding, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 159, 165 (1996). For a probing discussion of the use of 
history in English and American constitutionalism, see REID, supra note 16, at 28–40. 
271. E.g., GIENAPP, supra note 17. 
272. [Spencer Roane], Hampden I, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 11, 1819, reprinted in JOHN 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 113 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). 
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went well beyond debates about regulating expression.273 Over time, some 
thinkers proposed a broader conception of speech and press rights, but these 
ideas gained very little traction among judges. As the Supreme Court 
summarized in 1907, the “freedom of speech and freedom of the press . . . do 
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary 
to the public welfare.”274 
B. Juries, Judges, and Expressive Freedom 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court began to 
articulate far more robust free speech doctrines. And just as James Madison 
had reimagined the First Amendment’s origins, the Justices reimagined the 
Madisonian mythology. In its seminal decision in New York Times v. 
Sullivan,275 the Court claimed that “the great controversy over the Sedition 
Act . . . crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First 
Amendment.”276 The Sedition Act was “never tested in this Court,”277 Justice 
Brennan wrote—failing to mention that seven federal judges (including four 
of six Supreme Court Justices) had unanimously upheld its 
constitutionality.278 But “the attack upon its validity ha[d] carried the day in 
the court of history,” he triumphantly proclaimed.279 
The only consensus Republican argument against the Sedition Act, 
however, was that the federal government lacked any authority to regulate 
expression. Incorporating that concept against state governments would have 
been radical indeed, depriving state and federal authorities from 
implementing all sorts of uncontroversial laws, like bans on defamation, 
perjury, and fraud. And even Republican opponents of the Sedition Act had 
widely acknowledged that public officials could bring libel suits “upon the 
same footing with a private individual.”280 
 
273. See Kevin R. Gutzman, A Troublesome Legacy: James Madison and “The Principles of 
‘98”, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 569, 583–89 (1995) (examining this legacy); Kurt T. Lash, James 
Madison’s Celebrated Report of 1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 165, 182–86 (2006) (same); H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98: An Essay 
in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 690–96 (1994) (same). 
274. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). See generally 
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997) (examining free speech 
between 1870 and 1920). 
275. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
276. Id. at 273. 
277. Id. at 276. 
278. BLUMBERG, supra note 8, at 144–45. 
279. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276. 
280. TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY AND THE LIBERTY OF 
THE PRESS 259 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1800); see also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the 
Constitution of the United States (writing in 1803 that “the farmer, and the man in authority, stand 
upon the same ground: both are equally entitled to redress for any false aspersion on their respective 
characters, nor is there any thing in our laws or constitution which abridges this right”), in VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 91, 237–38 (1999); cf. 
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But rather than grapple with historical complexity, Justice Brennan and 
his colleagues reinvented the First Amendment yet again. The freedom of 
speech, the Court held, “prohibits a public official from recovering damages 
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves 
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice.’”281 Perhaps the Justices 
were simply misinformed about history, but it seems more likely that their 
decision—historical homages notwithstanding—was never really about 
fidelity to original meaning.282 
The many causes of developments in speech doctrine ever since are well 
beyond the scope of this Article, but one point is worth highlighting: the 
Supreme Court regularly announced speech-protective doctrines designed to 
shield speakers from the whims of biased or ignorant juries.283 As Justice 
Harlan explained, “[I]n many areas which are at the center of public debate 
‘truth’ is not a readily identifiable concept, and putting to the pre-existing 
prejudices of a jury the determination of what is ‘true’ may effectively 
institute a system of censorship.”284 With a brooding tone, he continued: 
“Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heritage cannot so 
readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity.”285 
Distrust of state judges and juries—particularly in cases coming out of 
the South—was commonplace in twentieth-century civil rights decisions.286 
 
JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS OF THE PRESS, 
AND THE UNCONTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND: CONTAINING AN INVESTIGATION OF 
THE RIGHT WHICH GOVERNMENT HAVE TO CONTROUL THE FREE EXPRESSION OF PUBLIC 
OPINION, ADDRESSED TO THE PEOPLE OF THE U. STATES 81–84 (N.Y.C., Johnson & Stryker 1801) 
(calling for unimpeded public debate about public figures, although seemingly not interpreting the 
First Amendment at this point of the argument). 
281. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
282. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
782, 790 (1986) (suggesting that the Court was motivated to “save the Times” from a “deep 
miscarriage of the common law process”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The 
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156 (1998) (“Fidelity to history wasn’t 
the goal of the doctrinal innovations of the 1960’s; adapting the law to immediate social needs 
was.”). 
283. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (“A negligence test [for defamation] 
would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the 
reasonableness of steps taken by it . . . .”). 
284. Id. at 406 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
285. Id.; see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 360 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] jury determination, unpredictable in the most neutral circumstances, becomes for 
those who venture to discuss heated issues, a virtual roll of the dice separating them from liability 
for often massive claims of damage.”); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1971) 
(“A standard of ‘relevance,’ . . . applied by a jury under the preponderance-of-the-evidence test, is 
unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech . . . .”); Hill, 385 U.S. at 402 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (highlighting the “capricious or whimsical circumstances” and “emotions and 
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Speech cases were no exception. The Court recognized the “freedom to 
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas” in a famous 
1958 decision overturning an Alabama court’s onerous (and legally 
meritless) discovery order and contempt judgment against the nation’s 
leading civil rights group.287 Just six years later, New York Times v. Sullivan 
involved an Alabama jury’s onerous (and legally meritless) damages award 
to a local official based on a civil rights advertisement.288 As it expanded 
doctrinal categories in order to limit abridgments of speech, the Court also 
ensured that it (and other courts) could review the factual bases of earlier 
decisions.289 Recent cases occasionally reflect similar concerns.290 For better 
or worse, an amendment designed in part to empower juries now stands 
firmly as a bulwark against their prejudices. 
More broadly, the Court’s mid-century speech and press decisions were 
part of an effort to elevate judicial scrutiny in those instances where the 
justices had less reason to trust the good faith of governmental officials.291 
The Court’s first significant doctrinal expansion under the First Amendment, 
for instance, came in Near v. Minnesota,292 which curtailed the power of trial 
judges to insulate themselves from criticism using contempt sanctions.293 
Other cases cut back on the ability of political officials to limit speech 
through discretionary licensing schemes,294 with the Justices occasionally 
signaling broader concerns of political entrenchment.295 The Supreme 
 
existing criminal procedure regime was institutionalized racism. . . . Modern criminal procedure 
reflects the Supreme Court’s admirable contribution to eradicating this incidence of American 
apartheid.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren 
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1388–89 (2004) 
(making a similar point); see also Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal 
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 61–67, 79–82 (2000) (giving particular attention to the issue of 
black jury service). 
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290. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (concluding that a jury would be 
“unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of [the] speech” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510)). 
291. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (laying out the 
framework for heightened scrutiny). For a provocative discussion of Carolene Products and its 
relationship to speech doctrine, see G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The 
Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 327–42 (1996). 
292. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
293. Id. at 712–15. 
294. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559–62 (1948) (striking down discretionary 
licenses for loudspeakers); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (striking 
down discretionary licenses for speech in streets and parks); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 
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Court’s earliest First Amendment decisions thus seem to align with a 
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review.296 
But while concerns about self-interested legislation and biased 
enforcement were often at play in these early cases, the Justices rarely relied 
on those concerns explicitly. And First Amendment law soon took a different 
turn. Judicial decisions and scholarly commentaries are now dominated by 
various substantive theories of expressive freedom, all of which seek to 
explain why speech and the press are deserving of special protection.297 The 
First Amendment, many argue, exists to protect democratic self-
government.298 Others point to its role in promoting a marketplace of ideas, 
“further[ing] the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of 
information.”299 Still more insist that free speech is essential to “individual 
self-realization.”300 
None of these theories were baked into the First Amendment, which 
originally allowed the government to regulate harmful speech in promotion 
of the public good.301 Nor does the Republican invention of First Amendment 
federalism offer a theoretical justification for treating speech as special. But 
for those inclined to reorient First Amendment doctrine in a more historically 
grounded direction, the response to the Sedition Act could still prove 
relevant. Republicans made strained arguments, to be sure, but their core 
insight endures: political entrenchment and politically biased enforcement 
are a clear danger to republican government. Perhaps it is time to bring that 
concern back to the doctrinal fore.302 
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